Preşedintele Traian Băsescu şi-a luat la Cotroceni doi consilieri britanici
În locul lui Andrei Pleşu, David Stuart Broucher, fostul ambasador al Marii Britanii la Praga. Rupert Vining va fi consilier special pentru problemele de combatere a corupţiei.
Iata si comentariul scurt al Andreei Bratosin, autoarea articolului:
Săptămâna aceasta, stafful de la Cotroceni s-a îmbogăţit cu doi britanici, care vor fi consilierii preşedintelui Băsescu pentru politică externă şi afaceri europene şi, respectiv, pentru probleme de combatere a corupţiei. Potrivit ambasadorului Marii Britanii în România, Quinton Quayle, la cererea lui Traian Băsescu, Londra a trimis la Bucureşti doi specialişti care vor lucra direct cu preşedintele. În locul lui Andrei Pleşu a fost numit fostul ambasador al Marii Britanii la Praga, David Stuart Broucher (61 de ani), un diplomat de carieră, al cărui ultim post a fost acela de şef al delegaţiei britanice la Conferinţa pentru Dezarmare. Celălalt consilier, Rupert Vining (42 de ani), este specializat în legislaţie europeană anti-corupţie. Ambasadorul Quayle afirmă că proaspeţii consilieri au primit la Cotroceni birouri apropiate de biroul preşedintelui, „ceea ce, în mod simbolic, demonstrează că sfaturile lor vor fi ascultate cu atenţie”.
In scurta sa istorie ca stat, Romania si-a construit deja o relatie lunga cu consilieri straini la toate nivelele. Gestul presedintelui Basescu n-ar trebui sa vina ca o surpiza, daca ne gandim ca in ultimii 150 de ani, romanii au fost de 'capul lor' numai de-a lungul a catorva decade carlisto-ceausiste.
Intrebandu-ne despre talcul acestor numiri, sa fie raspunsul incapabilitatea noastra de a tine drumul drept sau vreo nazbatie dincolo de declaratii a presedintelui Basescu? Ne reamintim desigur ca si germanii s-au oferit in cateva randuri sa ne ajute in termeni similari--ultima data fiind chiar dupa alegeri si era vorba de suport logistic impotriva coruptiei. Indiferent de talcul numirilor, aceasta alegere a unor cetateni britanici ne aseaza clar in tabara americano-britanica si, prin firea lucrurilor trans-atlantice, impotriva Frantei si posibil Germaniei daca nu se schimba orientarea politica a viitorului cancelar german. In alte cuvinte, axa Basescu este, cel putin din perspectiva Bucurestiului, parte din realitatea urmatorilor 4+ ani. Pe de alta parte, va fi interesant de vazut cum se vor reconcilia polul strain al puterii economico-financiare din Romania cu cel nou creat politic. Din primul, britanicii lipsesc aproape cu desavarsire (exceptie facand Mittal), iar al doilea este creat cu ei. Cei care sunt sarguinciosi deja se orienteaza corespunzator, celorlalti li se va povesti de la televizor!
Nota Bene: Se desleaga in felul acesta misterul plecarii d-lui Plesu de la Cotroceni si cel al declaratiilor d-lui Stelian Tanase in care presedintele Basescu era oarecum dojenit (ambele discutate pe larg si la peromaneste.com). Se pare ca presedintele Basescu e hotarat sa-si duca planurile de mai bine pentru romani fara prea multe apeluri la structurile traditionale romanesti. Conservatorism si restauratie in Romania vor insemna altceva de acum incolo. Mai mult, nu se poate spune ca nu adie deja schimbarea ce nu lasa nimic intamplator ca inainte.
3 comentarii:
David Stuart Broucher fiind examinat in legatura cu decesul lui Dr. Kelly
David Broucher called, examined by Mr Dingemans
LORD HUTTON: Forgive me just a moment.
MR DINGEMANS: Can you tell his Lordship your full name?
A. David Stuart Broucher.
Q. What is your occupation?
A. I am a member of the Diplomatic Service and I am currently a Permanent Representative to the
Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.
Q. How long have you held that post for?
A. Since September 2001.
Q. Briefly, before that what was your previous role?
A. I was the British Ambassador in Prague for four years before that.
Q. What do you do as the UK's Permanent Representative to the Conference on Disarmament?
A. To keep it short, and the thing that is relevant to this Inquiry is that I have been concerned with the
implementation of the biological weapons convention.
Q. Right. And in the course of that did you have any contact with Dr Kelly?
A. Yes. I met Dr Kelly once in connection with my duties. To the best of my knowledge this meeting
took place on 27th September, but there has been some difficulty confirming this because I was
definitely in Geneva on that day and according to the Foreign Office travel records Dr Kelly was in New
York. But we managed to establish this morning that he did not attend a meeting in Baltimore on 28th
February that he was due to attend, so my feeling is that he probably returned to Geneva -- to Europe
early and that he came to Geneva, because I did see him there.
Q. So the effect of all that is, doing the best you can, you think you met him on what day?
A. On 27th February.
Q. Of this year?
A. Of this year.
Q. And why were you meeting Dr Kelly?
A. We had tried to meet before, I believe on 8th November, but that had not proved possible. We
wanted to talk about the verification of compliance with the biological weapons convention and I was
keen to pick his brains because I knew that he was a considerable expert on these issues in relation to
Iraq.
Q. So the meeting in February 2003, and doing the best you can, you think in Geneva, is that minuted
anywhere in your diary?
A. No, I did not minute it and it is not recorded in my diary because it took place at very short notice. I
remember that Dr Kelly rang to say that he was in Geneva and he was going to pop in and see me.
Q. About what time do you think he turned up, during the day?
A. Probably around noon.
Q. Right. Did you have a meeting with him?
A. I did.
Q. How long did the meeting last?
A. About an hour.
Q. You said you wanted to pick his brains. What were you discussing?
A. We talked about the history of Iraq's biological weapons capability, about his activities with
UNSCOM, about what he thought might be the current state of affairs, and we talked a little about Iraq
and the biological weapons convention.
Q. What view did Dr Kelly express about the Iraqi position in terms of preparedness?
A. As far as I can recall, he felt that if the Iraqis had any biological weapons left it would not be very
much. He also said that the -- I believe it is called the fill for the weapons would be kept separately
from the munitions and that this meant that the weapons could not be used quickly.
Q. Your concern was, you have obviously the disarmament conference and the BWC. What does the
BWC mean?
A. It is the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972, which forbids the states parties to manufacture,
store or transfer biological weapons.
Q. And did you discuss that with Dr Kelly?
A. Yes, I did. The particular issue is whether it is possible to verify compliance with the Convention by
on site inspection.
Q. And you discussed that with him?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. And what was his view?
A. I think from his experience in Iraq his judgment was that you could gain quite a lot of certainty about
compliance with the Convention because, in the case of Iraq, there were very precise written records
about what they had made and destroyed. This was something he said that they had learned from the
British.
Q. Was Iraq, at the time, a member of the BWC?
A. He told me that Iraq did not ratify the BWC until 19 -- if I may just refer to my notes.
Q. I think it is September 1991.
A. September 1991.
Q. Was there an issue about whether or not Iraq would be chairing the Conference?
A. There was an issue about whether Iraq should chair the Conference on Disarmament. It was their
turn by alphabetical rotation but we were trying to prevent that, and I believe that we did.
Q. And at this stage, we know that Resolution 1441 has been passed and there had been further
subsequent inspections; Dr Kelly was not part of that team. I think the Iraqis had objected to any
British or American inspectors taking part.
A. That is my understanding.
Q. Did you discuss that with Dr Kelly?
A. I did not discuss the fact that the Iraqis had objected to British inspectors, no.
Q. No. Did you discuss whether or not inspections were going to be enough to deal with the situation?
A. My recollection is that Dr Kelly felt that inspections, properly carried out, would give a degree of
certainty about compliance.
Q. In relation to this meeting, you have told us, I think, that you did not have a note in your diary. Do
you have a clear recollection of this meeting?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. Did you then go on to discuss the possible use of force in Iraq?
A. We did.
Q. Can you tell us, in your own words, what was said?
A. I said to Dr Kelly that I could not understand why the Iraqis were courting disaster and why they did
not cooperate with the weapons inspectors and give up whatever weapons might remain in their
arsenal. He said that he had personally urged -- he was still in contact with senior Iraqis and he had
urged this point on them. Their response had been that if they revealed too much about their state of
readiness this might increase the risk that they would be attacked.
Q. Did Dr Kelly say how he was in contact or not?
A. He did not give any details of names or places or times; and I did not ask him that.
Q. Did he say what he had said to those persons that he had contacted?
A. He said that he had tried to reassure them that if they cooperated with the weapons inspectors then
they had nothing to fear.
Q. Which, as I understand it, was the position adopted by the United Nations.
A. So I understand, yes.
Q. And did he disclose how he felt about the situation?
A. My impression was that he felt that he was in some personal difficulty or embarrassment over this,
because he believed that the invasion might go ahead anyway and that somehow this put him in a
morally ambiguous position.
Q. Did he say anything further to you?
A. I drew some inferences from what he said, but I cannot recall the precise words that he used.
Q. What inferences did you draw?
A. Well, I drew the inference that he might be concerned that he would be thought to have lied to some
of his contacts in Iraq.
Q. Did you discuss the dossier at all in this conversation?
A. We did discuss the dossier. I raised it because I had had to -- it was part of my duties to sell the
dossier, if you like, within the United Nations to senior United Nations officials; and I told Dr Kelly that
this had not been easy and that they did not find it convincing. He said to me that there had been a lot
of pressure to make the dossier as robust as possible; that every judgment in it had been closely
fought over; and that it was the best that the JIC could do. I believe that it may have been in this
connection that he then went on to explain the point about the readiness of Iraq's biological weapons,
the fact they could not use them quickly, and that this was relevant to the point about 45 minutes.
Q. Did you discuss Dr Kelly's position in the Ministry of Defence?
A. He gave me to understand that he -- it was only with some reluctance that he was working in the
Ministry of Defence. He would have preferred to go back to Porton Down. He felt that when he
transferred into the Ministry of Defence they had transferred him at the wrong grade, and so he was
concerned that he had been downgraded.
Q. Right. Did you have any other conversation with Dr Kelly that day?
A. As Dr Kelly was leaving I said to him: what will happen if Iraq is invaded? And his reply was, which I
took at the time to be a throw away remark -- he said: I will probably be found dead in the woods.
Q. You understood it to be a throw away remark. Did you report that remark at the time to anyone?
A. I did not report it at the time to anyone because I did not attribute any particular significance to it. I
thought he might have meant that he was at risk of being attacked by the Iraqis in some way.
Q. And you, at the time, considered it to be a sort of general comment one might make at the end of a
conversation?
A. Indeed.
Q. Where were you in July this year on about 17th/18th July?
A. I was on leave in Geneva.
Q. And did you hear of Dr Kelly's death at all?
A. I believe I heard about it on the television news.
Q. Right. And did you see a picture of Dr Kelly on the news?
A. Yes.
Q. What was your reaction to that?
A. I recognised him, I realised that I knew him.
Q. And as a result of that what happened?
A. Nothing happened immediately because I was aware that I knew him but it was not until later that I
became aware of the circumstances of his death and realised the significance of this remark that he
had made to me, seemingly as a throw away line, when we met in February.
Q. Did you contact anyone about your recollection?
A. Yes, I did, not immediately but when the Inquiry began on 1st August it seemed to me that I needed
to make known this fact.
Q. Can I take you to CAB/10/9? How did you make this fact known?
A. I sent an e-mail to my colleague, the press officer for biological weapons in the Foreign Office,
Patrick Lamb.
Q. And you say to Patrick Lamb: "Is the FCO preparing evidence for the Hutton Inquiry?" We have
heard from Mr Lamb: "If so, I may have something relevant to contribute that I have been straining to
recover from a very deep memory hole." Is that right, that at the time your impression was that it was a
throw away remark, and is it also fair to say that it was deeply buried within your memory?
A. Yes, that is fair to say, and the other facts of the meeting took some time for me to remember; and it
took a long time to establish when the meeting took place because it was not noted in my diary.
Q. And can you just read to us the middle three paragraphs?
A. Of that e-mail?
Q. Yes.
A. "In a conversation in Geneva which I think took place in late February, he explained to me that he
thought that the Weapons Inspectors could have a good idea what the Iraqis had built and destroyed,
because they (Iraqis) were inveterate keepers of written records, something they had, he thought,
learned from us. There was a paper file on everything down to the smallest item. "Kelly said that his
Iraqi contacts had pointed to out to him that revealing too much about their state of readiness might
well heighten the risk that they would be attacked. To gain their trust he had been obliged to assure
them that if they complied with the Weapons Inspectors' demands they would not be. The implication
was that if an invasion now went ahead, that would make him a liar and he would have betrayed his
contacts, some of whom might be killed as a direct result of his actions. I asked what would happen
then, and he replied, in a throw away line, that he would probably be found dead in the woods. "I did
not think much of this at the time, taking it to be a hint that the Iraqis might try to take revenge against
him, something that did not seem at all fanciful then. I now see that he may have been thinking on
rather different lines." That e-mail that you sent to Mr Lamb, I think Mr Lamb brought to the attention of
those within the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and indeed has not yet answered the question
whether he knows of anything surrounding the circumstances of Dr Kelly's death that he might assist
his Lordship with, so that you can give this evidence. Is there anything further that you can say or
recollect relating to the meeting?
A. No, I think we have covered everything.
Q. In terms of strength of recollection, you have suggested that it was, as you thought at the time, a
throw away remark and you have shown on the e-mail a very deep memory hole. Is that reasonable to
characterise the way in which you had approached it at the time?
A. I think what I meant by a deep memory hole was that these were events that -- this was a
conversation that took place six months ago, and it had taken me some time to recall all the details of
it.
Q. Is there anything else that you know relating to the circumstances of Dr Kelly's death that you can
assist his Lordship with?
A. No.
LORD HUTTON: Thank you very much indeed, Mr Broucher. I think this would be a convenient time to
take a break. (3.15 pm) (Short Break) (3.20 pm)
S-ar putea ca numirea lui Dave sa fi fost ca recompensa a lui Blair pentru rolul lui David in investigatia mortii doctorului Kelly. Pe cine ar surprinde ca tipul sa fie in serviciile Maiestatii Sale, Regina si MI-x?
Rup este un fost avocat (relativ tanar) care a activat in diferite forumuri europene impotriva coruptiei (GRECO ect.).
Cu al doilea, presedintele Basescu primeste ceea ce spune ca a cerut. Cu primul ne vom dumiri noi pe parcurs.
E greu de spus cat ar fi facut Plesu in functia de consilier, iata descrierea acelei pozitii:
DEPARTAMENTUL RELAŢII INTERNAŢIONALE
ATRIBUŢIILE DEPARTAMENTULUI RELAŢII INTERNAŢIONALE
Coordonarea Calendarului diplomatic al Preşedintelui României;
Structurarea şi abordarea strategică a proceselor, evoluţiilor şi tendinţelor care se produc pe plan internaţional, regional, subregional şi zonal;
Analizarea, folosind mijloacele informaţionale şi competenţele de care dispune, a modului în care România se poziţionează în sistemul global al lumii contemporane, precum şi cel în care România este încadrată în contextul relaţiilor internaţionale, ca urmare a demersurilor altor state, elaborarea de proiecte de poziţie ale Preşedintelui României;
Coordonarea şi monitorizarea, în baza prerogativelor constituţionale ale Preşedintelui României, a activităţii instituţiilor care participă la elaborarea şi realizarea acţiunilor de politică externă ale Preşedintelui României;
Participarea, pe baza mandatului Preşedintelui României, la activităţile instituţiilor interguvernamentale cu atribuţii în domeniul cooperării internaţionale şi în cel al integrării europene;
Organizarea şi coordonarea activităţii structurilor de lucru consultative, instituite sub patronajul Preşedintelui României în domeniul relaţiilor internaţionale;
Fundamentarea şi elaborarea priorităţilor pe termen scurt şi mediu a orientărilor şi recomandărilor de politică externă ale Preşedintelui României pe baza analizelor proprii şi a informaţiilor furnizate de celelalte instituţii ale statului cu atribuţii în domeniu;
Asigurarea interfeţei de comunicare a Preşedintelui României cu instituţiile statului care au atribuţii în domeniul politicii externe în vederea realizării obiectivelor de politică externă ale României;
Cooperarea cu instituţiile abilitate, pentru crearea şi dezvoltarea lobby-ului pentru România în vederea îndeplinirii obiectivelor prioritare ale Preşedintelui României;
Armonizarea eforturilor tuturor instituţiilor statului cu competenţe în materie, în vederea dezvoltării relaţiilor cu românii de peste hotare, coordonarea politicilor, acţiunilor şi proiectelor destinate acestora şi gestionarea comunicării Preşedintelui României cu comunităţile româneşti;
Dezvoltarea dialogului între instituţiile statului şi românii de peste hotare, stimulând şi încurajând implicarea acestora în proiecte economico-sociale şi culturale;
Avizarea tratatelor, mandatelor de negociere sau a altor documente care angajează România şi răspunderea Preşedintelui României pe plan internaţional;
Avizarea propunerilor privind acreditarea sau rechemarea reprezentanţilor diplomatici ai României, respectiv înfiinţarea sau schimbarea rangului diplomatic al misiunilor României în străinătate;
Participarea la pregătirea şi realizarea vizitelor oficiale ale Preşedintelui României în străinătate, respectiv ale demnitarilor străini invitaţi în România de şeful statului, precum şi la primirile acordate de Preşedinte reprezentanţilor diplomatici acreditaţi în România şi altor personalităţi politice străine;
Organizarea secretariatului operativ şi asigurarea sprijinului tactic pentru celula de criză a Preşedintelui României, pentru a ajuta factorii de decizie politică în luarea hotărârilor privind gestiunea crizelor internaţionale care pot afecta România.
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