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5.4.12

POLONIA, din față


The Minister of Foreign Affairs on Polish Foreign Policy for 2012



2012.03.29
On 29 March 2012 the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland Radosław Sikorski delivered the annual address on Polish Foreign Policy for 2012.
For the full text of the Minister’s speech, as well as a document adopted by the Council of Ministers on 27 March 2012 entitled, Polish Foreign Policy Priorities 2012-2016please see below:





The Minister of Foreign Affairs on Polish Foreign Policy for 2012

Mr President,
Madam Speaker,
Mr Prime Minister, Government Ministers,
Your Excellencies, Members of the Diplomatic Corps,
Members of the House,
A year ago, I reported on our activities covering a full term in office. Today, as the longest-serving Minister of Foreign Affairs in the history of free Poland, I will unveil plans for a second term. Thanks to the trust you have put in the Civic Platform-Polish People’s Party coalition – as reflected in the last election results – Polish foreign policy has become more stable, and more predictable.
The correlation of forces around Poland is still propitious, though less so than recently. I see no threats to peace. Every year, Poland is moving closer to occupying its rightful place in the world. But the West’s economic and military might, as well as its prestige, have weakened. The Community decision-making method is being increasingly questioned in Europe and the economic crisis has made the European Union less attractive as a civilisation and less capable of exerting influence. The United States is cutting defence spending and reorienting towards the Pacific region. Thanks to high raw material prices and the determination of the Russian leadership, efforts are underway to unite former post-Soviet states around a political decision-making hub alternative to Europe.
We are forced to push forward with our plans at a time of global crisis. But before we get accustomed to the fact that Poland is coping with its aftermath better than any other country in Europe, I wish to remind you that this has not always been the case. During the Great Depression of the 1930s, citizens of the Second Polish Republic suffered from wide-scale poverty. In 1935 Poland’s GDP was half that of 1929, while unemployment in the East of the country topped 50 per cent. We live in difficult times, albeit not as dramatic as those I have just described. During this crisis, the Polish economy – which ranks sixth in Europe – is expanding, not contracting. According to the OECD, since 2007 we have been the fastest growing economy in this select group of 34 richest countries in the world.
Let me repeat once again: today’s Poland is the best Poland we have ever had. As the chief of Poland’s diplomacy, I believe it is my task to pursue Polish foreign policy in such a way as to substantially help improve our security, bring greater prosperity and boost our strength.
Members of the House,
Last year the main instrument which enabled us to buck and reverse worrying trends was, naturally, the Polish Presidency of the Council of the European Union. I am proud to state that despite the adverse circumstances, Poland’s leadership is widely viewed as the best one since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty.
 “Poland in the Vanguard of Europe” – to quote Libération, “The Oscar for Best Presidency Goes to Poland” – Hospodářské noviny, “Poland Holds Off Euroscepticism” – El País, “Let’s Learn the European Spirit from the Poles” – an Italian daily. These are just a few of the foreign press headlines devoted to the Polish Presidency.
Our countrymen were of a similar favourable opinion: no less than 68 per cent of Poles consider our Presidency a success. We have reaffirmed our status as a heavyweight Member State. We changed Poland’s image from a country which only benefits from the EU to a country which – true – benefits, but also inspires others to act. Today when others think of Poland, they think of economic growth, a modern country, and effective governance – we have become a partner worth courting.
Poland has proven that it is a reliable and responsible state – a country which creates solutions, not problems. We have kept faith in the European Union, advocating the principle of “more Europe – not less.” We have safeguarded EU cohesion in the face of proposals which undermined the very idea of the entire Community project. Thanks to Polish efforts, the European Parliament adopted the so-called six-pack – a set of regulations and directives enhancing the eurozone’s economic order. In my opinion, had the EU adopted it earlier, we could have avoided a crisis as severe as this one. The Polish Presidency also drafted the “European Consensus on Growth” – a report comprising recommendations on how to spur economic growth in Europe. Our Presidency also brought the EU closer to the adoption – after 30 years in the pipeline – of a compromise on the EU patent. We also signed an accession treaty with Croatia and closed six negotiation chapters with Iceland. Our administration demonstrated efficiency; our officials showed competence and effectiveness.
Despite the EU’s involvement in its Southern neighbourhood, the Polish Presidency managed to table anoffer to the East. We agreed on the text of the Association Agreement with Ukraine, due to be initialled as early as tomorrow. We have initiated negotiations on similar agreements with Georgia and Moldova. Whether our Eastern neighbours’ European aspirations will come true will depend largely on them. Warsaw hosted the 2nd Eastern Partnership Summit, at which EU Member States adopted a declaration on Belarus’ non-compliance with democratic standards. The debate on the text of the declaration also demonstrated that, unfortunately, not all Eastern Partnership countries are aware of the fact that the path to Europe leads through respect for the European standards of democracy.
I ask the Eurosceptics, how do you imagine our Eastern policy without the European Union? Could we have funded a project equal in scope to the Eastern Partnership by going it alone? It is there, in the East, that the phenomenon described in academic textbooks on European integration is most clearly visible: thanks to the EU, Poland’s influence is increasing manifold.
Ladies and Gentlemen,
During our Presidency, we kept with tradition and worked to ensure stable surroundings for the European Union, in both the Southern and Eastern dimensions of its neighbourhood policy. Both these vectors of our policy will be supported by the European Endowment for Democracy. We already have the necessary political agreement to initiate the project, which may begin operating before the end of the year. Poland is helping Arab states that are setting out on the difficult path of modernization and democratization.
We engage Europe in the pursuit of common objectives, including those of utmost importance for Poland’s foreign policy. At the same time, we give the EU the strength and means to put into action the objectives of the Union as a whole. Our successful Presidency strengthened Poland’s position in the EU – indeed, all around the world. Representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs acted on behalf of the High Representative on the occasion of 14 meeting with third countries; I myself deputized for Catherine Ashton several times. I spoke on her behalf before the European Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs and headed EU missions in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Thanks to the Presidency, Poland’s brand awareness has been raised globally. We are using this to effectively pursue our interests beyond Europe, particularly in Asia and Latin America.
During the Presidency we acted on behalf of the entire European Union, while at the same time looking after our national interests. A testament to this is the fact that the European Commission’s proposal on the 2014-2020 multiannual financial framework continues to serve as the basis for further negotiations. We oppose initiatives aimed at giving Poland less funds from the EU budget on account of our robust economic growth. We do not want to be punished for being a success story!
During the negotiations, we will initiate a round of intensive cooperation between the Polish parliament and parliaments of EU Member States. In direct coordination with Visegrad Group countries and the Friends of Cohesion Policy group, we will strive to prevent the budget negotiations from becoming an agreement between the biggest countries.
European investments are key for Poland: they help fend off the crisis and bolster domestic market activity. They are advantageous not only for its immediate beneficiaries; they also indirectly benefit the net payers by racking up profits for enterprises from these countries. This is also our contribution to the development of the entire Community.
For many years now, Poland has responsibly pursued its economic and financial policies. The provisions adopted fifteen years ago in our Constitution are now being copied by the rest of Europe. The draft provisions of the European “Fiscal Compact” repeat Article 216 of our Basic Law. We had no doubts that acceding to the Fiscal Compact was in Poland’s best interest. By 2015 we want to fulfil all of the convergence criteria and be able to adopt the euro. It is in Poland’s political interest to accede to the most tightly-knit group of countries that use the single currency.
The Presidency was the time of influencing Europe. But it also helped us understand the European Union – not as debutants, but as its co-hosts. President Bronisław Komorowski weighed in on the issue while addressing parliament, calling the Presidency – and I quote – “the crowning of Poland’s efforts, of the hard work of the entire Polish society and [...] all of the governments in power since 1989, all of our Presidents.”
Members of the House,
On Tuesday, the government adopted two documents. The first is Poland’s foreign policy priorities for the current year. The text itself is classified, but I can tell you that it is the first such document to include a list ofstrategic economic projects which we will fervently support. Last year, our diplomats made over 600 interventions on behalf of Polish companies active in over 60 countries; many in regions outside Europe, for example in war-torn Libya.
The second document, drafted pursuant to the Government Administration Branches Act, is entitled “Priorities of Polish Foreign Policy for 2012-2016”. It is the first foreign policy strategy to have been published in the last twenty years. It presents a detailed analysis of our objectives and the tasks that lie ahead. The document will be published in the next few minutes on the Foreign Ministry website. Madam Speaker, if possible, I would like to request that the “Priorities...” be included in the minutes of this session of the Sejm. Therefore, I would like to address here only those issues which I see as particularly crucial or pressing.
On account of our bilateral trade, but also increasingly due to the similarities between our economic cultures and political concepts, Germany is our most important European partner. Whether we look at its population, GDP, or the voting powers acquired under the Lisbon Treaty, Germany is the biggest shareholder in the European Union . The ‘biggest’ – with around one-fourth of shares – but not the ‘dominant’ one. This means that it is difficult to get anything done in the EU against Germany’s will, but it also means that in order to implement its ideas, Germany must look for more than just one partner. If a given endeavour is at risk, obviously it is the biggest shareholder that has the greatest responsibility – and the most means – to come to the rescue. We want to work together towards a stronger Union. As I said to our German friends during my speech in Berlin: “Provided you include us in decision-making, Poland will support you.”
We welcome our intensified cooperation with France, also in the Weimar Triangle framework. It is a good sign that France is beginning to appreciate Poland’s input in shaping a strong European leadership. We regret the fact that the United Kingdom – a country so dear to generations of Polish immigrants, including myself; which embraces a philosophy of freedom and particularly economic freedom that we share – is not willing to become a leader of European defence. We are looking forward to close political dialogue with the new governments of Spain and Italy.
We are working shoulder to shoulder with Sweden in implementing the Eastern Partnership and ushering in change in the EU’s entire neighbourhood. The world took notice of our disarmament proposals put forward together with Norway, a country which is also a source of inspiration for us in the field of sustainable exploration of natural gas deposits.
In July, when Poland takes over the Visegrad Group presidency, we will table a set of initiatives aimed at beefing up our excellent relations with the Czech RepublicSlovakia and Hungary. Today Hungary shoulders the responsibility for our region’s reputation in the field of respecting democratic principles. By 2016 we will have established the Visegrad Battle Group – our regional input into the development of the EU’s defence capacity. Our key partners – Romania and Bulgaria – will be invited to take part in many projects, including those coordinated within the Visegrad Group. We are glad to see our ties with Estonia and Latvia grow ever stronger. In our relations with Lithuania, we are hoping for a new opening with the government which will be sworn in after the October elections. Unvaryingly, we support Israel’s right to exist within secure boundaries, but we advise against war with Iran. We encourage dialogue with thePalestinians.
Ladies and Gentlemen,
In the East, things are worse than we would have wished, but much better than they had been in the past, or than they could be right now. We must count on evolutionary change to occur. Both Poland and the EU will offer incentives for further transformation in reply to tangible transformation activities, in line with the principle of “more for more.” One day, we would like to look at our Eastern neighbours and quote the words of Professor Jan Kieniewicz, “this is neither East, nor West – it is Europe, quite simply. Europe in the continent’s Eastern section, or an Intermarium of free citizens returned to Europe after many centuries.”
Ukraine remains our most important non-Atlantic strategic partner. We are invariably willing to support it – so long as it chooses its pro-European destiny. We call on the Ukrainian authorities to create political conditions – including standards of opposition treatment and electoral and judicial norms – which will make it possible to sign and implement the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement. We are looking forward to great football entertainment during the upcoming European championship.
We hope that the new president of Russia will lead his country on a path of modernization, in line with the expectations of Russian society. We will continue to work towards Polish-Russian reconciliation, which should take on a spiritual dimension during the upcoming and first-ever visit of the Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia.
We are glad that the Agreement on Local Border Traffic with the Kaliningrad Oblast is due to be implemented soon; we are all the more surprised by signals pointing to plans to deploy new-generation offensive arms in the area. We are pushing hard for the return of our property – the wreckage of the Tu-154 plane in which our leaders and friends perished.
In its relations with Europe, Belarus unfortunately insists on sticking to the principle of “less for less.” In line with the proposal put forward by Donald Tusk during the Eastern Partnership Summit, we have prepared a cooperation offer which will await the day when repression ends and the political opposition is allowed to play its due role.
The United States is our most important non-European partner. We get on especially well whenever and wherever we decide to join forces and foster the ideals of freedom and democracy. We are glad that U.S. companies are prospecting for Polish shale gas reserves and bidding to provide technologies for planned nuclear power plants. We will welcome with open arms the permanent U.S. military detachment to be stationed in Poland. We stand ready to implement the Poland-U.S. agreement on the missile defence base, even though we are aware of the fact that U.S. plans may be subject to modification, for example, if an agreement is reached on Iran’s nuclear programme. We expect President Barack Obama to fulfil his obligation to include Poland under the visa waiver programme, even though we note that visa-free travel to the U.S. now requires payment and prior registration.
Members of the House,
Our security is first and foremost in the hands of the Polish Armed Forces; in the international dimension we count on NATO support. According to NATO’s budget office, in the past twenty years Poland overtook all other countries in terms of defence spending increases, which amounted to 210 per cent. We will do our best to make sure that the decisions taken at the upcoming NATO Summit strengthen the Alliance’s capabilities to fulfil its primary objective: to safeguard the territorial integrity of its Member States. We also expect a decision on the pullout from Afghanistan. Pursuant to the already adopted timeframe, Poland will phase out its activities; by the end of this year, we will cease combat and begin operating as a training mission. Political arrangements are currently underway which would make it possible to announce in Chicago the achievement of so-called interim operability of NATO’s ballistic missile defence system.
The experiences of the Polish Presidency show us that EU Common Security and Defence Policy is unfortunately impossible to implement in a group of 27 countries, and that we must initiate tighter cooperation between willing countries, in line with the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty.
This year we begin the campaign to make Poland a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council in 2018.
Members of the House,
We are providing new momentum to the local government and civic dimension of our foreign policy. We have received new budgetary allocations – PLN 8 million in all – which will enable us to support Polish towns and regions to establish and maintain valuable contacts with their counterparts abroad.
We have streamlined our network of diplomatic missions. They will be located wherever Poland interests are present. Wherever Poles invest, work, vacation and visit families and friends. The closing of selected diplomatic posts was accompanied by the opening of others: two new consulates in Sebastopol and Vinnytsya, soon to be followed by the consulates in Donetsk and Smolensk. The recently launched e-Consulate system makes it possible to file visa applications via the Internet. A few weeks ago, we inaugurated a Polish Institute in Tokyo. As part of the Polish cultural offensive in Asia, we are planning on setting up two more Institutes: in Beijing and New Delhi.
At the same time we are rationalizing employment in the MFA headquarters and in our missions abroad. But a reduction in staffing levels in not an aim in itself; our goal is to optimize the Foreign Ministry’s workflow and to build a competent and citizen-friendly foreign service. A foreign service in which paychecks are higher, but which also imposes higher demands on its staff. For our diplomats to live up to these expectations, this year we are planning an across-the-board reform of our in-service training system.
Last week we initiated a design contest – which we hope will be final – for our Embassy in Berlin. Next month I will officially open the new residence of the Polish Ambassador to the United States. Our consulate in the City of London is being renovated. At the same time we will be selling over-large or redundant real estate in Cologne, Paris, Washington, Lille and Brussels.
Thanks to a decision taken by this House, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will take over the Senate’s responsibility for managing funds to support the Polish diaspora and Poles living abroad. I wish to thank the Senate for its great work in caring for our fellow countrymen and women all over the world. We wish to continue this task, providing the Polish diaspora with judicious support, in line with its real needs in the country of residence. Access to Polish education will be our top priority. Our long-term goal is to make the Polish diaspora a viable entity, helping it to support Poland ever more effectively.
Members of the House,
My speech before the German Society for Foreign Affairs – delivered at the peak of the eurozone crisis – sparked a heated discussion both at home and abroad. At the time, I criticized Germany for not engaging itself enough in saving the euro area, of which Germany is the biggest beneficiary. I said that, “I fear German power less than I am beginning to fear German inactivity.” I am glad to note that two events have taken place since then. Germany gave the European Central Bank a green light to inject EUR 1.018 trillion into the eurozone banking sector, thus mitigating the crisis. Second, Germany elected Joachim Gauck as its new President, who chose Warsaw for his first foreign visit. As a country with such a noble man for President, Germany really no longer gives us any cause for fear.
I wish to once again thank the House for weighing the vote of confidence in my favour by 292 votes to 152 – much more than required by parliamentary arithmetic. However, out of respect for the opposition’s dissenting opinions, I would like to return to two notions which dominated the discussion: sovereignty and federalism.
The first recorded use of the word ‘sovereignty’ dates back to 1576 and Jean Bodin, who used it to denote a sovereign’s exclusive right to exercise legislative and executive power in his territory. When the sovereign has been replaced by the people, it has come to be defined as the capability to exercise exclusive political authority over a given territory and population – independently of any external entities. This definition, too, is clearly anachronistic.
After all, whenever we subject ourselves voluntarily to the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, or hand over a Polish national to an EU Member State court pursuant to a European arrest warrant, do we really feel that we have lost the authority to govern ourselves? Do you really lose the feeling of being your own host at home by implementing this or that European directive? Do we lose the joy stemming from independence after losing a vote in the European Parliament? Not in my view.
Sovereignty today is thus something more subtle than just the exclusivity of political power. It is the feeling that we will not lose our ability to take good or bad decisions at any stage of the process of enhancing international cooperation. In other words, it is just as our forefathers saw it: nothing about us shall be decided without us. What is crucial is whether we have subjected ourselves to the rules voluntarily, and whether we have the ability to withdraw from the system as a last resort. The European integration process meets both of these criteria. We acceded to the EU after long efforts, as a result of a nationwide referendum. Meanwhile the Lisbon Treaty – negotiated by President Lech Kaczyński – introduced an “exit clause” for Member States wanting to withdraw from the EU.
Eurosceptics need to understand that the way of thinking about international politics, which originated from the Peace of Westphalia, is too simplistic today. To perceive international relations solely in the category of a “Jurassic park” is to distort reality. As a founding father of the Community once said – I quote – “A thinking European can no longer take Machiavellian delight in his neighbour’s failures.”
In today’s world, unrestrained sovereignty is solely the province of autarchic, self-isolating states – unreliable states. The Belarusian leader brags before his people of having absolute sovereignty, for example in the face of “EU pressure.” This means that he can indeed throw oppositionists into prison, while at the same time remaining totally dependent on those who supply oil and gas to Belarus, or who give the country credit guarantees – and then threaten to withdraw them. Similarly, the North Korean regime is at the mercy of China, and continues to negotiate new shipments of U.S. food aid.
The only effective way to preserve the practical capability to act is to build alliances of like-minded countries. European policies are precisely the tools which help strengthen Polish sovereignty. As Václav Havel once noted, “Yelling about non-specific national interests is simply a way of masking one’s lack of self-confidence, and it is surely not the only way of acquiring prestige or a unique position within the Community.”
Sovereignty grants us the status of a subject of international relations, and a rather large one at that: in the top thirty of the UN’s 200 member states. May this sovereignty function not as an incantation preventing us from concluding advantageous agreements, but as an instrument to pursue our interests and aspirations. Leszek Kołakowski pertinently said, “Sovereignty [...] is not about a country being able to remain indifferent to the existence, interests and aspirations of other countries. In this sense, even the United States cannot be called sovereign. A country enjoys sovereignty not through a lack of real limits imposed by others or through an – unfeasible – economic autarky, but because it takes any and all decisions, whether good or bad, by itself, also when such decisions are forced upon by the circumstances or by others: even a country which decides on a course of action as a result of a threat from one of its neighbours retains its sovereignty; after all, it may decide otherwise – even to act against its own best interests.”
Greece’s current position depicts the dilemma of defining sovereignty. Not for one moment has the country lost its legal sovereignty. All of Greece’s decisions are taken by way of a democratically elected parliament and government. Greece is free to announce insolvency, return to its national currency, and try to cope with the crisis on its own. But, put into practice, the need to obtain aid to fund the recovery programme forced it to adopt certain laws within prescribed deadlines, and to accept supervision over the implementation of these laws by external entities. There is nothing outrageous about this. Just as an unreliable debtor must sell off his loan security or start living within his means, no country has the right to live at others’ expense. This is both an economic fact and a moral imperative.
It all began when, in 2008, the market began to question the arbitrary decisions taken by financiers, who – sitting in front of their computer screens 10 years ago – concluded that being a member of the euro area alone guarantees a country’s solvency. After a period of illusory equilibrium in an apparently stable eurozone, we are back to square one: a country is only as reliable as its assets. Thus, the most sure-fire way to retain real sovereignty is to shape a country’s finances – its deficit and debt – in a way which would encourage investors to buy its bonds at a sustainable borrowing cost. As long as countries need credit, they will have to offer government bonds at a yield which someone is willing to accept.
How does Poland fare in this reckoning? How are we safeguarding our financial sovereignty? Where are we on the scale between the soundest financial standing and insolvency?
Let us not forget that the Polish People’s Republic gave up the ghost as a bankrupt state. After imposing marital law, the Communist authorities declared insolvency and for a decade Poland did not service its foreign debt. Only the free Poland negotiated a debt reduction, exchanged old debt for Brady bonds, and made its way back to international financial markets.
The shifts in our bond yields are a good illustration of David Hume’s thesis, which states that there is no better indicator of a country’s richness than the rate of interest it pays. In 1994 in order to find buyers for Polish bonds with a three-year maturity period, we were forced to offer a 16-percent interest. In 2000 it fell by half, to just over 8 per cent. A decade on, investors were glad to be paid just over 5 per cent.
This February, the yield on Polish ten-year euro-denominated registered bonds was just 4.8 per cent. The government of Portugal has to pay at least 12 per cent to sell an analogous set of securities. According to stock exchange quotations, last month the yield on our ten-year eurobonds fell below 4 per cent for the first time in history. Italian and Spanish ten-year notes were priced higher. What is more, this month – for the first time in history – the cost of insuring five-year Polish bonds was lower than that of its French equivalent. Even before, we had already outdone SpainItaly and Belgium. We are now hot on the heels of Austria.
This is a measure of a country’s real trustworthiness, which cannot be disputed. Investors – who put their money where their mouth is – rely on hard data, not fleeting impressions. When their opinions of Poland are coherent with good reviews in the press, it should be a source of satisfaction. We should build a modern version of Poland’s patriotism based not on bloated honour, but on solid achievements.
Since the appointment of the Donald Tusk government, the yield on our five-year bonds fell by 1.1 percentage points. These data are not mere statistics, but carry measurable implications for the national budget and for taxpayers. According to my calculations, a one per cent drop in the cost of government bonds amounts to savings of almost PLN 7.6 billion in annual debt-service costs. That represents 38 hospitals, or 34 state-of-the-art combat aircraft. This is our annual bonus for being financially responsible.
The struggle for financial credibility is therefore a struggle for the strength of our country and for the prosperity of its citizens. But it is also much more than that. It is also a struggle for our practical sovereignty. This is because other countries – but not us – lived above their means, established overly generous social security and pension systems, and ended up losing markets’ confidence. Today, they are facing the threat of losing the ability to shape their own financial and economic policy.
This unprecedented growth of Poland’s credibility did not materialize out of thin air. It is the result of two decades’ worth of Poles’ hard work. A sound policy pursued by the government – which did not let itself be manoeuvred into macroeconomic recklessness – did its bit to help. That’s because the patriotism of today is about more than squabbling with our more powerful neighbours. It is about patiently laying the foundations of Poland’s strength.
What’s the moral of the story? If you want to do something to boost Poland’s credibility – indeed, it’s sovereignty – support further public finance reform. Raise your hand in favour of the government’s pension reform. And if you fail to raise your hand, put away those slogans about sovereignty.
Members of the House,
After my speech in Berlin, there was much mention of the term ‘federation’ – sometimes as an accusation, or even an insult. Let us listen to what Juliusz Mieroszewski, a columnist for the Polish Paris-based “Kultura” monthly, had to say on the subject: “Every federation is always a sum of compromises. Gone are the days when we federalized others. Today, the only federation possible is one based on complete equality. It may come to be that the pursuit of a federation scheme will entail the need to make sacrifices. Those who declared and continue to declare that “we shall give nothing away” should be reminded that it is more advantageous to make certain sacrifices for the sake of having a political system in Europe that will guarantee Poland safe development for hundreds of years to come, instead of shouting that we shall give nothing away and when disaster strikes, to leave the Country on the eighteenth day of the war.”
I do not agree to the term ‘federation’ being used in the Polish public debate as a synonym for ‘treason’. After all, for long periods of our history we operated within unions: confederations and federations. Together with our neighbours, we established federations of states – personal unions, as well as federal states – real unions. I said this in Berlin, and I shall say it again today. Beginning in the late 14th century, we joined forces with the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Had our personal union in the early 17th century with Russiaworked, we would not only have avoided the partitions, parliamentarism might have advanced back then as far as the Pacific. Now for a maths exercise: in Poland’s thousand-year history, we experienced no less than four centuries of federation. Here I would like to quote Pope John Paul II’s famous Roman appeal from 2003: “from the Union of Lublin to the European Union.” A wise federation may thus serve as a path to building strength in unity, and not to losing our identity.
When trying to answer the question what would be the best constitutional compromise today, thinking about what suits us best will not suffice. One must ponder the possible scenarios of EU development and think about how Polish concepts can be made part of what the other members of the European family are willing to accept.
In the first scenario, which seemed not inconceivable last autumn, the EU collapses. As early as 1924, Paul Valéry asked, “This Europe, will it become what it is in reality, that is, a small cape of the Asiatic continent?” After the events of the last several months, we can no longer take the European Union’s survival for granted.
Here is the worst-case scenario. In a Union whose future is up in the air, some Community policies die off. Those that still remain are vestigial. The Schengen system is dismantled bit by bit; more and more countries shut their borders to fend off economic migrants from other Member States. The single labour market disappears as a result. Obviously, the Multiannual Financial Framework falls apart – after all, who would be willing to pour billions of euros into something that might have to be written off anyway? As a consequence, Common Agricultural Policy and Cohesion Policy funds dry up. Because countries are unable to compensate for lower competitiveness with Community transfers, they reimpose customs barriers. The Socrates-Erasmus student exchange programme collapses: nobody can afford to send young people abroad to study. Egoism, particular interests and protectionism take hold. Europe returns to its tragic past. Solidarity loses out to “survival of the fittest”. The external dimension of EU foreign policy is washed away completely: European Neighbourhood Policy, trade policy, the European External Action Service. A divided Europe loses its chance to remain a key player in international trade and politics. Tired with defence spending stinginess and a general European inefficiency, the USA opt out of NATO. Russia fills the void left by the West in the East; China fills the void in Asia. The Arab world is engulfed by transformation crises. Europe is no longer a role model for anyone.
Where is Poland in this nightmarish vision? It is left to fend for itself on the periphery of a stagnant Europe. It is grappling with an uncompleted modernization process; its security foundations are undermined.
The second – unfortunately very plausible – scenario is that of a drift. The European Union retains its current shape. Debt-stricken Member States toil to repair their public finances. Controversies over the euro continue to surface, but they are not bitter enough to bring about a collapse. European politicians manage to extinguish the fires, but they have no clue where the sparks that set them off come from. Somehow the individual policies operate, but are faulty and at the mercy of Member States. Because tough decisions are constantly put off, the EU economy fails to expand. Sclerosis sets in. Somehow, Europe manages to hobble along, but it resigns itself to decline.
The third scenario – a remedy for the first two – is that of utopian federalism. By this I mean a type of federalism which assumes replacing Member States with a unitary supranational state. Sovereignty is transferred to Brussels. The right to secede is abolished. Last week, I was astonished to hear a socialist government minister from “old Europe” suggesting that the European Parliament be strengthened in a manner which would pave the way “for the abolition of national parliaments.” There are also some politicians in Poland who dream of producing “cookie cutter” Europeans.
I want to say it loud and clear to the utopians: such a Union should not, and will not, exist. Not only is your vision ahistorical and removed from reality, it is outright harmful to the ideal of European integration. We are not willing to build a uniform, bureaucratic super-state managed by an isolated and impersonal elite of Eurocrats.
Finally, the fourth scenario: deeper integration and the creation of a stable political union. This is our vision. We assume that Member States will forever remain independent. With the right to exit the EU. And the right to define the scope of powers transferred to the Community level. I believe that identity, culture, religion, way of life, and the principal tax rates should forever remain in the hands of nation states.
We are neither utopians nor naïve euro-enthusiasts. We have our feet firmly on the ground of political realism. We know that the end of history has not arrived. That in today’s Europe you must fight for your national interests. If anyone in this House still harbours any doubts, let me just add: we will never renounce our Polish identity. Just as Germans are not renouncing their German identity, or Frenchmen their Gallic one, we too will remain Poles. The European identity will not replace the Polish one; it may only strengthen it.
We will, however, be steadfast in our support for deepening integration whenever it serves Poland and Europe. For tightening EU external border controls. For completing the single services market – which would boost Europe’s GDP by an extra 1.5 per cent – and for establishing a single digital market, another 4 per cent rise in GDP. For implementing a competitive energy market – trading in particular in gas – which would banish the spectre of energy-related blackmail and cut costs for consumers. The European Commission should have a similar competence in single market affairs as in competition policy. In order to make this happen, we need less directives and more regulations, applicable directly.
We are in favour of strengthening both the Community method and democracy by combining the post of President of the European Commission and that of the European Council, elected by the European Parliament or perhaps even by universal suffrage. Some MEPs should be elected from a pan-European list of candidates. Today I am saying this not only on my own behalf, but pursuant to a decision taken by the Council of Ministers.
Political union means offloading past burdens and past inhibitions. Putting forward solutions, co-shaping the European Union. This is Poland’s vision of Europe. All the while, we are aware that Poland’s say in European matters will be bigger as the country’s economic standing improves, and if the Polish elites are responsible and pro-European.
Upon handing the Presidency over to the Danes, Prime Minister Donald Tusk reminded us that “the history of European integration shows that each crisis pushes the European project forward.” Poland is disappointed with the wait-and-see approach that currently dominates Europe. A real-life political union calls for an ambitious budget. In the United States, the federal budget amounts to some 30 per cent of GDP; in the EU it hovers around 1 per cent. Moreover, only one-tenth of the EU budget stems from own contributions. This share should increase, also by way of a financial transaction tax.
That is why I repeat: further integration with a view to permanent political union is in Poland’s interest. Only such a form of integration is capable of reinforcing Community institutions. Only political union gives us a chance to reinforce democracy on the EU level and to promote Europe to the rank of a superpower.
I devoted much room to clarifying certain terms because – to quote Ludwig Wittgenstein – “the limits of my language are the limits of my world.” Despite what dogmatic Marxists tend to say, we are not slaves to the impersonal forces of history; we can alter the course of history according to our ideas. After all, “In the beginning was the Word.” And words must not confine us to a world which will never return, but inspire us to build a Europe in which Poland is an indispensible power.
Ladies and Gentlemen,
We are on the right path. Poland’s voice is being listened to and heard throughout Europe, while our proposals are the object of careful analysis. If Poland is to cement its position in the first league of European countries, we must dispassionately analyze our potential and influence. We must act in the spirit of uprisings and battles won – not lost. Poland must be stronger, not just braver.

I ask the House to accept this Information.
Thank you for your attention.
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Un comentariu:

peromaneste spunea...

La Bucuresti nici nu poti visa de un asemenea discurs; deh, sunt mai multi imbogatiti pe la Bucuresti decat pe la Varsovia care au resedinte in zone exclusive ale Vestului...

Polonezii manaca realpolitik pe paine si au prins din mers semnalele: Mai binele natiunii este un interes legitim care determina pozitia in UE, si intre SUA si Rusia, fara iluzii sau sentimentalisme, fara lozinci, dar cu pragmatism maxim.

Mai mult, de la polonezi n-au plecat elitele dupa 1989, ci s-au intors din elita poloneza acei emigranti care sa-i puna inapoi pe harta (v-aduceti aminte de dl. Rugina?).

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