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| Thierry de Montbrial, membru de peste 30 de ani în comitetul director al Grupului Bilderberg |
Fiul fostului inspector general al Băncii Franţei, Thierry de Montbrial (69 de ani) a absolvit Şcoala Politehnică şi are un doctorat în economie de la Universitatea Berkeley. Profesor la mai multe facultăţi, este director-fondator al Institutului Francez de Relaţii Internaţionale şi a condus Centrul de Analiză din Ministerul de Externe al Franţei. Membru în comitetul director al Grupului Bilderberg, el face parte şi din alte organizaţii influente, precum Conferinţa Atlanticului sau Comisia Trilaterală, şi din boardul unor publicaţii precum „Foreign Policy". De asemenea, Thierry de Montbrial este membru în mai multe academii, iar în prezent este favorit pentru ocuparea funcţiei de cancelar (preşedinte) al celebrului Institute de France.
Academicianul Thierry de Montbrial, directorul Institutului Francez de Relaţii Internaţionale, se află, începând de astăzi, în România, pentru a-şi lansa cartea „Jurnal românesc", o culegere de însemnări din timpul numeroaselor vizite în ţara noastră, începute încă din 1990.
Reporter: Una dintre calităţile menţionate în CV-ul dvs. este aceea de membru în comitetul director al Grupului Bilderberg, organizaţie despre care adepţii teoriilor conspiraţioniste susţin că ar conduce lumea. Cum comentaţi ipoteza că aţi fi fost desemnat să gestionaţi, din partea acestui for, spaţiul românesc?
Thierry de Montbrial: Clubul Bilderberg este un club de personalităţi „transatlantice", care se întruneşte anual pentru a discuta, într-o atmosferă de încredere, problemele internaţionale majore. Acest club nu distribuie niciun rol pentru membrii săi, care se exprimă în mod individual, independent. Cu riscul de a vă dezamăgi, din păcate, în experienţa mea de peste 35 de ani, nu-mi amintesc să fi fost abordat subiectul României.
În volumul pe care îl lansaţi amintiţi că preşedintele Ion Iliescu nu a întrunit, de-a lungul mandatelor sale, sprijinul politicienilor francezi, fiind considerat mai degrabă „un comunist". În schimb, dvs. l-aţi văzut ca pe „omul situaţiei", un fel de Mitterrand român. Putem considera că, într-o anumită măsură, Iliescu a fost sprijinit de Grupul Bilderberg sau a fost doar o opţiune personală?
Aşa cum vă spuneam, România nu a fost niciodată subiect de discuţie la Bilderberg, şi nici Ion Iliescu. În ceea ce priveşte Franţa, situaţia din România a fost şi rămâne prost înţeleasă, atât de clasa politică, dar şi de opinia publică. La începutul anilor '90, Ion Iliescu nu era cunoscut în Franţa altfel decât prin trecutul său de tânără „stea" în anii '70. Eu, personal, cred că el a jucat un rol fundamental şi pozitiv în tranziţia de la dictatură la democraţie. Şi am admirat totdeauna abilitatea sa într-o situaţie extrem de dificilă. Acesta este motivul pentru care am făcut comparaţia cu François Mitterrand.
Totuşi, în acelaşi timp cu dvs. s-au aflat în România Richard Haass, preşedintele influentului Consiliu pentru Relaţii Internaţionale din SUA, şi Étienne Davignon, fostul vicepreşedinte al Comisiei Europene şi coleg în Grupul Bilderberg. Pe de altă parte, trei români sunt membri în Comisia Trilaterală, iar în ţara noastră şi-au făcut apariţia cluburi discrete de dezbateri pe acest model. Am intrat şi noi în zona rarefiată a puterii discrete?
Eu însumi am fost membru al Comisiei Trilaterale timp de peste 20 de ani şi mă bucur că România este reprezentată acum în acest for. Vorbiţi despre „puterea discretă". Nu cred că această expresie este convenabilă. Dreptul de asociere este o libertate democratică fundamentală, iar cluburile despre care vorbim nu au ca scop luarea unor decizii, ci de a face schimb de idei. Deoarece România este membru în Uniunea Europeană şi în NATO, este firesc să fie tot mai prezentă în astfel de cluburi.
I-aţi cunoscut pe toţi preşedinţii României, dar şi pe unii dintre candidaţii la funcţia supremă. Guvernatorul BNR, Mugur Isărescu, v-a lăsat una dintre cele mai bune impresii. Aţi apreciat „apariţia sa de bancher rasat, cu o solidă pregătire profesională". În 2000, românii nu l-au ales însă ca preşedinte. În 2014, vor vota din nou. După aproape 14 ani, consideraţi că, acest model ar putea avea succes ? Alegătorii s-ar putea regăsi de această dată în persoana unui preşedinte mai degrabă elitist decât popular?
Îmi este foarte dificil să fac previziuni cu privire la alegerile în propria mea ţară, aşa încât nu aş putea pretinde că pot să vorbesc în numele românilor. Însă, Mugur Isărescu are o mare experienţă, el este bine-cunoscut şi apreciat de comunitatea internaţională. Dar, în calitate de observator şi analist, eu ştiu că în ţările democratice alegătorii sunt, în general, indiferenţi faţă de profilul internaţional al candidaţilor la alegeri. Fie că este vorba de Europa de Vest sau de Statele Unite ale Americii, puţini sunt şefii de stat sau de guvern care au ajuns la putere bazându-se pe aceste criterii. Însă este posibil că alegătorii români vor dori pentru succesiunea preşedintelui Băsescu o personalitate cu un profil distinct, diferit. Aceste „mişcări de balanţă" sunt comune în politică.
Aţi mai afirmat că unii dintre cei mai valoroşi interlocutori pe care i-aţi descoperit în România sunt Adrian Năstase şi Mircea Geoană. Ambii se află într-o perioadă mai puţin fastă a carierei lor politice, în ciuda imaginii bune pe care şi-au construit-o în faţa partenerilor externi. Ce şanse de revenire le acordaţi?
Ambii au participat la evenimente în cadrul Institutului Francez de Relaţii Internaţionale. Ambii au o dimensiune internaţională recunoscută. Politica de multe ori trece prin suişuri şi coborâşuri. Amintiţi-vă, de exemplu, că în SUA la începutul anilor '60 Richard Nixon era considerat un om al zilei de ieri. Şi apoi a devenit preşedinte, cu urmările şi sfârşitul pe care le cunoaştem.
Apreciaţi despre Petre Roman că este un tip „prea intelectual pentru a reuşi pe termen lung în politică". Aprecierea aţi făcut-o chiar în 1990 şi s-a confirmat. Alt intelectual, Andrei Pleşu, a avut, de asemenea, o carieră politică scurtă. Sunt multe alte exemple. De ce nu reuşeşte intelectualul român în politică?
Nu este ceva propriu doar României. Experienţa îndelungată îmi permite să afirm că sunt foarte rare cazurile când adevăraţii intelectuali, profesori sau oameni de ştiinţă, au avut o viaţă lungă în politică. Contraexemplele, cum ar fi Vaclav Havel, sunt figuri simbolice care apar doar în situaţii excepţionale, cum a fost cazul în Cehoslovacia în 1989.
Notaţi în „Jurnal românesc" că „sunt mulţi oameni care nu-i iubesc pe români, acuzându-i de toate şireteniile, de toate compromisurile, de toate ambiguităţile, de intrigi şi trădări". Credeţi că în ultimii ani s-au mai diminuat aceste percepţii?
Nu am niciun instrument de măsurare. Stereotipurile mor greu! Îmi petrec viaţa auzind repetând aceleaşi clişee despre francezi sau despre belgieni! Ceea ce îmi pare important este că relaţiile umane între Franţa şi România, de exemplu, se dezvoltă. Eu însumi am încercat să contribui la acest lucru, cu multă plăcere, începând cu 1990.
Unde vedeţi România, într-o proiecţie pe zece ani, pe scena relaţiilor internaţionale?
Ca noi toţi, România trebuie să depăşească dificultăţi interne, sociale, economice sau politice. Personal, având în vedere tragediile din istoria ţării dvs. în secolul al XX-lea, admir progresele înregistrate după 1990. Dar drumul este încă lung, mai ales că, în acest timp, partenerii dumneavoastră din cadrul UE şi din afară s-au angajat într-o cursă frenetică pentru modernizare, lumea în ansamblul ei este tot mai competitivă. Mărturisesc că sunt deosebit de preocupat de fenomenul exodului de creiere, care ar putea goli România de esenţa sa cea mai de bază, şi anume capitalul uman.
Prezenţa dvs. în România vine într-un context de schimbări profunde, atât aici, cât şi în Franţa. Întrebarea are două părţi. Prima: au vreo legătură aceste evenimente cu vizita dvs.? A doua: ce consecinţe pot avea aceste schimbări asupra relaţiilor româno-franceze?
Surâd, supraestimaţi puterea şi influenţa mea! Cu toate acestea, dificultăţile actuale în relaţiile dintre ţările noastre nu par legate de natura guvernelor existente. Dar sper că soluţii reciproc satisfăcătoare vor fi găsite prin intermediul clasic al canalelor diplomatice. De asemenea, sper că, în timp, vor avea loc mai multe întâlniri politice la nivel înalt între Franţa şi România.
Thierry de Montbrial a confirmat faptul că, anul viitor, intenţionează să organizeze un forum mondial la Bucureşti, din seria World Policy Conference, la care participă importanţi lideri ai lumii. „Iniţial, îmi propun să prezint prietenilor mei români obiectivele acestei conferinţe, dedicată în întregime diferitelor aspecte ale guvernanţei globale", a explicat academicianul francez.
El a ţinut să precizeze însă că această iniţiativă nu are legătură cu Grupul Bilderberg din care face parte. „Atrag atenţia asupra faptului că, spre deosebire de cluburile despre care am discutat, World Policy Conference este în întregime publică. Oricine poate intra pe site-ul www.worldpolicyconference.com, pentru a face cunoştinţă cu lucrările conferinţei, începând cu anul de lansare, adică 2008", a mai spus Thierry de Montbrial.
Articole de sau despre Thierry Montbrial in Foreign Affairs/CFR:
1985
From one year to the next, it is difficult to find original words to describe the state of transatlantic relations. Indeed, they are bound to continue to constitute a "troubled partnership," and 1985 was no exception. To a large extent, it was the year of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). On the surface, even though most European strategists are more than skeptical about the concept, SDI has not created major tensions among the Western allies. The British and the German governments supported President Reagan's initiative. Italy showed some interest; France, Norway, Greece and Denmark rejected any governmental role, but avoided any confrontation. Overall, Washington may be pleased.
From one year to the next, it is difficult to find original words to describe the state of transatlantic relations. Indeed, they are bound to continue to constitute a "troubled partnership," and 1985 was no exception.
To a large extent, it was the year of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). On the surface, even though most European strategists are more than skeptical about the concept, SDI has not created major tensions among the Western allies. The British and the German governments supported President Reagan’s initiative. Italy showed some interest; France, Norway, Greece and Denmark rejected any governmental role, but avoided any confrontation. Overall, Washington may be pleased.
The year brought further displays of the American mood of unilateralism. This is true, for example, in Soviet-American relations, culminating in the November summit meeting in Geneva; the initiatives in this evolving relationship are not primarily the consequence of West European persuasion. Similarly with economic issues. Washington’s change of attitude through this year on exchange rates and the value of the dollar has been quite remarkable. As a result, the meeting in New York of the five biggest Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries on September 22 could produce a joint approach on how to drive the dollar value down. The American position on indebted Third World countries has also evolved.
Altogether, American and European positions on world macroeconomic management have come closer together—although the Europeans still consider that American authorities have not yet taken the relevant measures to significantly reduce the U.S. budget deficit, which they continue to regard as a major source of global imbalance. The point here is that the change of attitudes vis-à-vis economic problems, just like East-West relations, have only modestly been influenced by the Europeans. It was rather the product of an internal American debate...
ESSAY
OCT
1975
The world economic order born after World War II, to a large extent fashioned by the United States, was based on two fundamental principles-in monetary terms, the principle of fixed parities and the dollar standard (although the dollar was convertible into gold at the request of the central banks); in commercial terms, the principle of non-discrimination and free trade. Practically speaking, the United States was assuming the role played by Britain during its period of greatness. This lasted until August 15, 1971, when President Nixon suspended the convertibility of the dollar. Over the years, we witnessed the fantastic growth and development of the defeated nations, Germany and Japan, and the emergence of the European Community-developments encouraged by the United States. The stupendous economic expansion of the capitalist West is, without a doubt, the most remarkable feature of this postwar period. The even greater expansion of trade (particularly intra-European) appears in this respect to be both a cause and an effect.
The world economic order born after World War II, to a large extent fashioned by the United States, was based on two fundamental principles-in monetary terms, the principle of fixed parities and the dollar standard (although the dollar was convertible into gold at the request of the central banks); in commercial terms, the principle of non-discrimination and free trade. Practically speaking, the United States was assuming the role played by Britain during its period of greatness. This lasted until August 15, 1971, when President Nixon suspended the convertibility of the dollar. Over the years, we witnessed the fantastic growth and development of the defeated nations, Germany and Japan, and the emergence of the European Community-developments encouraged by the United States. The stupendous economic expansion of the capitalist West is, without a doubt, the most remarkable feature of this postwar period. The even greater expansion of trade (particularly intra-European) appears in this respect to be both a cause and an effect.
Several discordant notes nevertheless were struck. As Europe gained momentum, the United States took offense (e.g., the dispute over the common agricultural policy, attacks against the policy of association with third countries). Meanwhile, some European nations began denouncing the manifestations of American hegemony (the enormous expansion of U.S. investments abroad, growing balance-of-payments deficits) and voices were raised accusing the United States of disregarding the rules of free trade when these did not serve its best interests (e.g., the insistence on the "American selling price" exception in the Kennedy Round)...
Putin may not finish his mandate
Published: 02 May 2012
Vladimir Putin's first decade in power was a positive one, but the series of mistakes he made recently augur for a difficult mandate, said Thierry de Montbrial, founder and Director General of the French Institute for International relations IFRI, in an exclusive interview with EurActiv. Putin will be inaugurated as President on 7 May.
Thierry de Montbrial has a long experience of Russia and has had several meetings with Vladimir Putin. He recently published his book "Journal de Russie 1977-2011". He will present his book in Brussels on 2 May at Librairie Filigranes, Av. Des Arts 39-40
He was speaking to EurActiv Senior Editor Georgi Gotev.
Your book "Journal de Russie 1977-2011" is both a diary of your experience with Russia and an analysis about where is Russia going. But maybe you would like to explain yourself…
In English the title of this book would be "Russian Diaries". My very first visit to the Soviet Union was in 1977, it was my first physical and human discovery of Russia. And the last one which is taken into account in the book was in September 2011. I am not myself an ideologue. I wanted to perceive the Soviet Union first and then Russia with my own eyes, my own feelings, with being too ‘invaded’ so to speak by ideology…
And stereotypes about Russia…
And stereotypes, absolutely correct. I have always been personally attracted to that part of the world as by the way many French persons are. Indeed it has to do with history, with also certain books which influenced me when I read them when I was very young at school.
I’m attracted to Russian culture and people. Very early I developed positive feelings vis-à-vis this country which go far beyond politics. For me politics is one thing but the reality of the country is much more important than politics.
Over the years I had many trips, and many encounters. Because as you can see I have met many people, some of them very well-known, such as the big leaders Gorbachev, Putin and many others. But many of my interlocutors were also much more common people, sometimes very young people with whom I had a lot of discussions, which I try to report in these diaries.
I have also made a number of friends. So it’s a very personal account of a French observer and analyst trying to understand Russia better.
I don’t know if it was calculated or not, but your book appears just before the inauguration of Vladimir Putin for another presidential mandate, on 7 May. What is your perception of Putin?
The date of publishing was the choice of the publisher who thought that there would be more attention and that is why we rushed to have the book published I think the first two or three weeks after the [4 March] elections.
As for my perception of Vladimir Putin, well, first, I think that it was very clear to me and it’s very clear in reading the book, that the nineties were horrible years for the Russian citizens.
I was very much struck during those years. At the time people, including very educated and also some experts, started to believe that the Russian Federation itself could fall apart and that this disintegration process could go as far as going back to the Grand Duchy of Moscow.
These things were seriously discussed in the nineties. It was very clear to me in those years that the Russians were looking for a strongman. I referred specifically to General Lebed [General Alexander Lebed was a charismatic politician who was placed third in the 1996 presidential election. He died in 2002 in a helicopter crash] who has been guest here at IFRI, who took himself for [a Russian-style] De Gaulle.
There was clearly a strong demand in Russia for a strongman succeeding Yeltsin [Boris Yeltsin served as President from 1991 to 1999]. That strongman happened to be Vladimir Putin. Of course nobody knew Putin, even when he started his top career as a prime minister, it was taken by most observers as a joke - they thought that he would survive as prime minister for three or four months…
My first point about Putin is that his fate was to be ‘the' strongman that the Russians were waiting for. Also, he was very much helped by events in the sense that the price of oil increased over time and helped him of course to re-establish order and to put the economic development in the right direction.
But on the whole I think that the Putin Decade was quite a positive one. That’s point number one.
Point number two, I met him personally several times. The first time was in the year 2000, just after his first election as president. I hosted a dinner-debate for him in Paris and on this very first occasion I found him extremely intelligent and sharp-minded. I think in French terms he could be certainly considered to be as ‘the best technocrat in France’.
His mind works extremely well. He knows problems and issues in detail. He is certainly a very hard worker. Later on as one of the first participants to the so-called ‘Valdai Club’ to which I participated regularly for a number of years, I saw him in action on the occasion of these meetings, sometimes you know discussions with him in a small group for three or four hours, and I was very much impressed by his performance.
On the whole I am convinced that history will judge more positively than negatively this first decade.
Knowing Russia a little bit myself, it is relatively easy to agree with what you said but the big question is about the future. Is Putin the right person to lead?
You said that it is very easy to agree with what I say, but it is certainly not the dominant view in France for instance.
For the future, my vision is relatively simple. I think Putin himself did not expect the kind of social consequences of his own success. All the demonstrations which took place at the end of last year were by people who during his own years reached a certain social status and certain economic level.
These people now want to have freedom and live in a more democratic way, in the Western sense. And I think this is something that he certainly had not anticipated.
Very clearly looking at the way he reacted to those events and weeks, he did not understand them fully. He was a bit shocked I think.
One of his merits he did not even try, probably he thought about doing it, to crush those forces. But the fact is that paradoxically thanks to his own successes over the last decade, he has released social forces that now are here to stay.
He suddenly made a big mistake. The big mistake was his deal with Medvedev, to say “OK now we switch.” I think this in fact discredited him and Medvedev, who is in fact probably much more discredited than he is.
To go to the conclusion, first I think that when he decided to modify the constitution, to have a six-year term renewable once, he probably had in mind to be president for the next years up to 2024.
My first conclusion is that it is extremely unlikely that he will do a second term and it might even be quite difficult for him to end the first term. Because the next six years will I think see a continuation of huge social changes in Russia. Especially if Russia is developing well economically.
That will be continuation of the same paradox. In other words, my perception is that the great paradoxical consequence of the successes achieved in the previous decade is that Russia is now entering a new phase which is totally unprecedented in Russian history.
That is a gradual move towards more democracy in the Western sense. That would be gradual of course. I think from a historical viewpoint it would be recognised that to a large extent it is thanks to Putin.
But paradoxically again the consequence will be that Putin will certainly not stay as president for twelve years. Maybe six, maybe less.
Europe is in crisis, and geopolitically it is ‘downgraded’ compared to other players. Should Europe seek to become closer to Russia precisely to regain its geopolitical status? Or do you think that this is impossible for the decades to come?
Well I think there are two different issues here. One is that, when you say Europe of course you mean the European Union, we still have a lot of work to do to put our house in order. There is absolute necessity to restore financial equilibria, fiscal consolidation, all these things, which have nothing to do with the relationship with Russia.
That is a first point and of course with the likely election of François Hollande in France in a few days now, there will be a new test. But I’m absolutely convinced that the future of the European Union depends first and finally on the capacity to put its house in order economically and financially. That’s point number one.
Second, I fully agree that in broad geopolitical terms it’s absolutely essential to build up a more consistent and more coherent relationship between the European Union and Russia.
Of course we can continue to have bilateral political relations because the European Union is not going to be a unified political unit soon. So we will continue to have various foreign policies and bilateral links.
But I think it is absolutely essential to have a more coherent, structured, well-framed policy between the EU and Russia. And this of course is directed against nobody. The common geopolitical and economic interests are absolutely obvious not only in the field of energy, say, it’s a geopolitical reality.
And these developments can be accelerated if Russia continues to develop gradually in its own way in a democratic direction.
He was speaking to EurActiv Senior Editor Georgi Gotev.
Your book "Journal de Russie 1977-2011" is both a diary of your experience with Russia and an analysis about where is Russia going. But maybe you would like to explain yourself…
In English the title of this book would be "Russian Diaries". My very first visit to the Soviet Union was in 1977, it was my first physical and human discovery of Russia. And the last one which is taken into account in the book was in September 2011. I am not myself an ideologue. I wanted to perceive the Soviet Union first and then Russia with my own eyes, my own feelings, with being too ‘invaded’ so to speak by ideology…
And stereotypes about Russia…
And stereotypes, absolutely correct. I have always been personally attracted to that part of the world as by the way many French persons are. Indeed it has to do with history, with also certain books which influenced me when I read them when I was very young at school.
I’m attracted to Russian culture and people. Very early I developed positive feelings vis-à-vis this country which go far beyond politics. For me politics is one thing but the reality of the country is much more important than politics.
Over the years I had many trips, and many encounters. Because as you can see I have met many people, some of them very well-known, such as the big leaders Gorbachev, Putin and many others. But many of my interlocutors were also much more common people, sometimes very young people with whom I had a lot of discussions, which I try to report in these diaries.
I have also made a number of friends. So it’s a very personal account of a French observer and analyst trying to understand Russia better.
I don’t know if it was calculated or not, but your book appears just before the inauguration of Vladimir Putin for another presidential mandate, on 7 May. What is your perception of Putin?
The date of publishing was the choice of the publisher who thought that there would be more attention and that is why we rushed to have the book published I think the first two or three weeks after the [4 March] elections.
As for my perception of Vladimir Putin, well, first, I think that it was very clear to me and it’s very clear in reading the book, that the nineties were horrible years for the Russian citizens.
I was very much struck during those years. At the time people, including very educated and also some experts, started to believe that the Russian Federation itself could fall apart and that this disintegration process could go as far as going back to the Grand Duchy of Moscow.
These things were seriously discussed in the nineties. It was very clear to me in those years that the Russians were looking for a strongman. I referred specifically to General Lebed [General Alexander Lebed was a charismatic politician who was placed third in the 1996 presidential election. He died in 2002 in a helicopter crash] who has been guest here at IFRI, who took himself for [a Russian-style] De Gaulle.
There was clearly a strong demand in Russia for a strongman succeeding Yeltsin [Boris Yeltsin served as President from 1991 to 1999]. That strongman happened to be Vladimir Putin. Of course nobody knew Putin, even when he started his top career as a prime minister, it was taken by most observers as a joke - they thought that he would survive as prime minister for three or four months…
My first point about Putin is that his fate was to be ‘the' strongman that the Russians were waiting for. Also, he was very much helped by events in the sense that the price of oil increased over time and helped him of course to re-establish order and to put the economic development in the right direction.
But on the whole I think that the Putin Decade was quite a positive one. That’s point number one.
Point number two, I met him personally several times. The first time was in the year 2000, just after his first election as president. I hosted a dinner-debate for him in Paris and on this very first occasion I found him extremely intelligent and sharp-minded. I think in French terms he could be certainly considered to be as ‘the best technocrat in France’.
His mind works extremely well. He knows problems and issues in detail. He is certainly a very hard worker. Later on as one of the first participants to the so-called ‘Valdai Club’ to which I participated regularly for a number of years, I saw him in action on the occasion of these meetings, sometimes you know discussions with him in a small group for three or four hours, and I was very much impressed by his performance.
On the whole I am convinced that history will judge more positively than negatively this first decade.
Knowing Russia a little bit myself, it is relatively easy to agree with what you said but the big question is about the future. Is Putin the right person to lead?
You said that it is very easy to agree with what I say, but it is certainly not the dominant view in France for instance.
For the future, my vision is relatively simple. I think Putin himself did not expect the kind of social consequences of his own success. All the demonstrations which took place at the end of last year were by people who during his own years reached a certain social status and certain economic level.
These people now want to have freedom and live in a more democratic way, in the Western sense. And I think this is something that he certainly had not anticipated.
Very clearly looking at the way he reacted to those events and weeks, he did not understand them fully. He was a bit shocked I think.
One of his merits he did not even try, probably he thought about doing it, to crush those forces. But the fact is that paradoxically thanks to his own successes over the last decade, he has released social forces that now are here to stay.
He suddenly made a big mistake. The big mistake was his deal with Medvedev, to say “OK now we switch.” I think this in fact discredited him and Medvedev, who is in fact probably much more discredited than he is.
To go to the conclusion, first I think that when he decided to modify the constitution, to have a six-year term renewable once, he probably had in mind to be president for the next years up to 2024.
My first conclusion is that it is extremely unlikely that he will do a second term and it might even be quite difficult for him to end the first term. Because the next six years will I think see a continuation of huge social changes in Russia. Especially if Russia is developing well economically.
That will be continuation of the same paradox. In other words, my perception is that the great paradoxical consequence of the successes achieved in the previous decade is that Russia is now entering a new phase which is totally unprecedented in Russian history.
That is a gradual move towards more democracy in the Western sense. That would be gradual of course. I think from a historical viewpoint it would be recognised that to a large extent it is thanks to Putin.
But paradoxically again the consequence will be that Putin will certainly not stay as president for twelve years. Maybe six, maybe less.
Europe is in crisis, and geopolitically it is ‘downgraded’ compared to other players. Should Europe seek to become closer to Russia precisely to regain its geopolitical status? Or do you think that this is impossible for the decades to come?
Well I think there are two different issues here. One is that, when you say Europe of course you mean the European Union, we still have a lot of work to do to put our house in order. There is absolute necessity to restore financial equilibria, fiscal consolidation, all these things, which have nothing to do with the relationship with Russia.
That is a first point and of course with the likely election of François Hollande in France in a few days now, there will be a new test. But I’m absolutely convinced that the future of the European Union depends first and finally on the capacity to put its house in order economically and financially. That’s point number one.
Second, I fully agree that in broad geopolitical terms it’s absolutely essential to build up a more consistent and more coherent relationship between the European Union and Russia.
Of course we can continue to have bilateral political relations because the European Union is not going to be a unified political unit soon. So we will continue to have various foreign policies and bilateral links.
But I think it is absolutely essential to have a more coherent, structured, well-framed policy between the EU and Russia. And this of course is directed against nobody. The common geopolitical and economic interests are absolutely obvious not only in the field of energy, say, it’s a geopolitical reality.
And these developments can be accelerated if Russia continues to develop gradually in its own way in a democratic direction.
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A World in Need of a New Order
By THIERRY DE MONTBRIAL
April 1, 2009
Future historians might look at the collapse of the Soviet Union as the end of the 20th century, and at the current financial crisis as the beginning of the 21st. Remarkably, these two macro events have a common root, which is also the root of globalization: the revolution of Information Technologies.
In the 1970s, the IT revolution accelerated the arms race; the Soviet Union proved unable to follow the United States. Ultimately, the Marxist-Leninist system and ideology vanished.
The financial and more generally the managerial revolution occurred in the 1980s. The world economy embarked on a strong and stable upswing. In the 1990s, many could believe that democracy and market economy had won an irreversible victory and would quickly spread everywhere.
The “international community,” led by the United States, seemed to be on the way to universal peace and prosperity. It was a dream. History came back under the presidency of George W. Bush, starting with 9/11 and ending with the burst of an unprecedented asset bubble. The institutional framework of world governance erected since World War II proved a failure.
What the international community can and must demonstrate now is a willingness to undertake a full reconstruction The G-20 summit would be a great success if it could achieve just that, in addition to agreeing on credible immediate economic and financial measures.
Any attempt to rebuild governance must recognize that the new international system must be multipolar, heterogeneous and global.
Multipolarity means that although the United States will remain the only superpower for the foreseeable future, it can no longer pretend to lead the world alone. This is why we need a relevant group of permanent members for the U.N. Security Council, which would potentially include at least the following five natural “poles” — the United States, Japan, China, Russia and European Union. The members of this group should recognize they collectively share responsibilities for a politically sustainable globalization process, including such issues as climate change.
They should recognize that collective leadership implies taking into account the interests of smaller states. In particular, efficiency and legitimacy imply that regional approaches should systematically be encouraged and developed. For example, no peace and security framework in the Middle East is conceivable without Iran as a major regional partner.
Heterogeneity is a crucial reality. Such countries as China or Russia will not become liberal democracies in the foreseeable future, not to speak of many smaller states. Nonetheless, Western countries should cooperate and develop confidence-building measures with all of them. They should refrain from arrogant neo-colonial attitudes. Democracy and human rights should spread by virtue of examples set by those who claim the superiority of these values.
There is no way to maintain an open world without strong states able and willing to cooperate through efficient and legitimate frameworks. If we fail to move in this direction, we risk reproducing a kind of post-World War I scenario: The combination of nationalist forces and beggar-thy-neighbor protectionist policies could lead to a planetary disaster.
http://www.amazon.com/s/ref=ntt_at_ep_srch?_encoding=UTF8&field-author=Thierry%20de%20Montbrial&search-alias=books&sort=relevancerank
L’incapacité des dirigeants à se mettre d’accord pour sortir de cette crise risque de nous plonger dans un chaos indescriptible, s’inquiète Thierry de Montbrial, directeur général de l’Ifri, l'institut français des relations internationales. Il plaide pour une mise sous tutelle de la Grèce et pour une stricte politique de réduction des déficits.
Capital.fr : L’Ifri vient de publier Ramses 2012, son rapport annuel sur la situation politique et économique mondiale. Cette année, l’ouvrage est intitulé « Les Etats submergés ? ». Submergés par la dette et incapables d’agir ?
Thierry de Montbrial : Nous sommes à un moment de vérité. Les économies occidentales sont arrivées au bout d’une logique. Depuis la seconde guerre mondiale, les Etats-Unis ont profité de leur statut de super-puissance pour faire tourner la planche à billets et s’endetter afin de financer leur croissance. Mais avec l’avènement de la Chine, ils sont en train de perdre leur hégémonie. Les Etats-Unis doivent changer de modèle. Or, ils sont en période pré-électorale et l’opposition entre Républicains et Démocrates n’a jamais été aussi idéologique. Les pays européens, eux, n’ont jamais respecté les critères de Maastricht et le niveau d’endettement a doublé depuis 2007 à cause de la crise et des plans de relance. Face à ce constat le temps presse. Or l’incapacité des Etat à mettre leur maison en ordre est inquiétante. Et les dirigeants ne sont d’accord ni sur le diagnostic ni sur les mesures à adopter pour sortir de cette crise.
Capital.fr : Ce manque de consensus risque d’aggraver la situation…
Thierry de Montbrial : Nous allons aller de crise en crise jusqu’à nous trouver au bord du précipice. La faillite de la Grèce, la baisse de la note d’un pays comme l’Italie pourraient déclencher un sursaut chez nos gouvernants, en espérant qu’on n’en arrivera pas à dégrader la France. Aujourd’hui une explosion de la zone euro ne peut plus être totalement exclue. Le risque est tellement grand, l’inconnue est telle qu’il est aujourd’hui impossible de décrire précisément le chaos dans lequel nous serions plongés. D’où la nécessité absolue d’agir sans tarder.
Capital.fr : Comment éviter un tel scénario catastrophe ?
Thierry de Montbrial : Il faut mettre la Grèce sous la tutelle pour veiller à l’application des réformes annoncées. Les pays de l’Eurozone doivent mettre de l’ordre dans leurs affaires et s’engager dans la voie d’une gouvernance économique et financière plus proche de la pensée allemande. C’est-à-dire ne pas céder aux sirènes des néo-keynésiens et mener une politique stricte de réduction des déficits et d’amélioration de la compétitivité. Ce virage permettra ensuite d’envisager la création d’un gouvernement économique européen et de mettre en place des euro-obligations, qui permettront alors de mutualiser certains risques.
Capital.fr : La Chine, le Brésil, la Russie et l’Inde peuvent-ils profiter de cette situation ?
Thierry de Montbrial : Les BRIC s’offrent un joli coup de pub en apparaissant comme d’éventuels sauveurs. Ils adoptent un ton condescendant et la Chine donne des leçons de vertu économique. C’est de bonne guerre. Reste que si la crise perdure, la Chine n’en sortira pas indemne, vu sa dépendance aux économies américaines et européennes. Quant aux autres pays des BRIC, leur influence politique a plutôt tendance à diminuer.
Propos recueillis par Frédéric Cazenave
The inability of leaders to agree to get out of this crisis could plunge us into chaos, worries Thierry de Montbrial, President of IFRI , the French Institute of International Relations. It argues for a trusteeship of Greece and to a strict policy of deficit reduction.
Capital.fr: Ifri just published Ramses 2012, its annual report on the political and economic crisis. This year, the book is entitled "States overwhelmed? ". Overwhelmed by debt and unable to act?
Thierry de Montbrial: We are at a moment of truth. Western economies have reached the end of logic. Since WWII, the U.S. took advantage of their status as superpower to run the printing presses and to borrow to finance their growth. But with the advent of China, they are losing their hegemony. The United States must change the model. However, they are in pre-election period and the contrast between Republicans and Democrats has never been so ideological. European countries, they have never met the Maastricht criteria and the level of debt has doubled since 2007 due to the crisis and recovery plans. Faced with this much time. The inability of state to put their house in order is of concern. And officers do not agree either on diagnosis or on the measures to adopt to overcome this crisis.
Capital.fr: This lack of consensus may aggravate the situation ...
Thierry de Montbrial: We will lurch from crisis to crisis until we find the brink. The bankruptcy of Greece, the fall of the note of a country like Italy could trigger a surge in our leaders, hoping they do not happen to degrade France. Today an explosion in the euro area can not be totally excluded. The risk is so great, the unknown is such that it is now impossible to accurately describe the chaos in which we would be immersed. Hence the absolute need to act now.
Capital.fr: How to avoid this nightmare scenario?
Thierry de Montbrial: We must put Greece under the supervision to ensure the implementation of announced reforms. Eurozone countries should put their house in order and engage in a path of economic and financial governance closer to German thought. That is to say not to yield to the temptations of the neo-Keynesians and conduct a strict policy of deficit reduction and increased competitiveness. This shift will then consider the establishment of a European economic government and establish Eurobonds, which will then allow to pool risks.
Capital.fr: China, Brazil, Russia and India can they take advantage of this situation?
Thierry de Montbrial: The BRIC provide a nice publicity stunt by appearing as potential saviors. They adopt a patronizing and China gives lessons of economic virtue. This is fair enough. But if the crisis continues, China will not escape unscathed, given its dependence on U.S. and European economies. As for the other BRIC countries, their political influence tends to decrease.
Interview by Frédéric Cazenave
La scurt timp după alegerea lui Francois Hollande drept noul preşedinte al Franţei, fostul consilier prezidenţial al lui Francois Mitterand, fondator şi primul Preşedinte al Băncii Europene pentru Reconstrucţie şi Dezvoltare, actualmente Preşedinte al Comisiei de Creştere Economică a Franţei, Jacques Attali vine la Bucureşti, la cea de-a 9-a ediţie a Forumului Financiar, ce are loc în perioada 22-24 mai 2012.
Cum se transformă Europa în noua epocă a socialistului Hollande şi care va fi impactul programului său de creştere economică asupra ţărilor Europei de Sud-Est - acestea sunt câteva dintre subiectele de pe agenda de discuţii a Preşedintelui Comisiei de Creştere Economică a Franţei, cu ocazia vizitei sale la Bucureşti. Unul dintre cei mai mari 100 de intelectuali ai lumii contemporane (Foreign Policy Magazine), Jacques Attali se va întâlni la Bucureşti, între alţii, cu Alexandre Maymat, Preşedintele BRD Groupe Societe Generale, Ionuţ Costea, Preşedintele Eximbank, Steven van Groningen, Preşedintele Raiffeisen Bank, Radu Graţian Gheţea, Preşedinte CEC Bank, Ioan Hidegcuti, Preşedintele Fondului Român de Contragarantare, Timothy Ash, Director pentru Europa de Est, RBS UK, Dieter Merz, Director Dezvoltare, MIG Bank, Elveţia.
La Forumul Financiar 2012, Bucureştiul devine şi în acest an capitala financiară a Europei de Sud-Est. Peste 400 de delegaţi din 10 ţări europene vor participa la întâlnirea cu Jacques Attali, într-un dialog de anvergură despre transformarea regulilor de business în Europa de Sud–Est şi soluţiile de adaptare la o lume în continuă schimbare.
Organizat în fiecare an în luna mai la Bucuresti, Forumul Financiar este evenimentul anual de referinţă al mediului financiar-bancar din Europa de Sud – Est, în cadrul căruia laureaţi ai premiului Nobel, analişti internaţionali de top, guvernatori ai băncilor centrale din regiune, preşedinţi de burse, miniştri de finanţe, lideri de companii descompun mecanismele financiare, analizează tendinţe, dezbat marile provocări din economie, propun soluţii. Celebrul “Profet” al crizei, Nouriel Roubini sau laureaţii Nobel în economie Joseph Stiglitz, Edmund Phelps şi Edward Prescott sunt doar câteva dintre vedetele internaţionale de prestigiu care au vizitat România cu ocazia ediţiilor anterioare ale Forumului Financiar.
Forum Invest este cel mai important organizator de evenimente internaţionale de business din România şi unul dintre cei mai prestigioşi din Europa.
În cei 15 ani de funcţionare, peste 6.000 de personalităţi politice, oameni de afaceri, lideri de opinie, analişti şi jurnalişti din toată lumea, au participat la evenimentele Forum Invest, organizate în peste 20 de locaţii din toată lumea.
Forum Invest este singura companie din România care, prin forumurile economice şi cluburile de afaceri exclusiviste pe care le organizează în ţară şi în străinătate, susţine şi promovează comunicarea naţională şi transfrontalieră între jucătorii politici şi instituţionali, comunitatea de afaceri şi presă.
Fără a fi europocentrist, nu pot totuşi să trec peste constatarea că, în ultimele milenii, europenii au contribuit definitoriu la dezvoltarea civilizaţiei universale.
De cele mai multe ori au fost promotori ai schimbărilor progresiste nu doar pe propriul continent, ci în întreaga lume. Au fost secole la rând când Europa a dat tonul, a determinat caracteristicile sistemului internaţional. S-a antrenat în competiţiile globale fără inhibiţie, deşi, trebuie să recunoaştem, nu întotdeauna în mod onorabil. De exemplu, de pe continentul european au izbucnit cele două conflagraţii mondiale, în secolul al XX-lea, care au cauzat traumele umanitare cele mai teribile.
CINE SE TEME DE SCHIMBARE?
M-au surprins, însă, comentariile unor importanţi lideri de opinie şi politicieni din anumite state membre ale Uniunii Europene, în săptămâna care a trecut, despre ce efecte ar putea să apară în Uniune dacă se produce o schimbare a titularului de la Elysée, ca urmare a scrutinului democratic recent încheiat in Franta. Trec peste faptul că multe dintre materialele publicate de media occidentală propuneau scenarii dintre cele mai fanteziste despre formele de manifestare ale politicii europene, în cazul unei schimbări de genul celei menţionate, în subsidiar proiectând interese mult mai înguste decât cele europene. M-ar fi bucurat o grijă sinceră a politicienilor şi comentatorilor politici despre soarta, căile de dezvoltare a Uniunii Europene! Numai că, de cele mai multe ori, state, corporaţii, sectoare economice îşi plângeau ele însele de milă şi nicidecum nu exprimau îngrijorări despre interesul Europei.
O astfel de gândire pretinde numai schimbarea pe care o proiectează emiţătorii ei şi nicidecum pluralitatea de factori interdependenţi care, fiecare şi împreună, pot genera transformări fundamentale ale societăţii, inclusiv a celei europene. Probabil, astfel de „europeni" îşi imaginează Uniunea Europeană ca pe un buştean care şi-ar modifica forma numai când ei dau cu barda! Or, din fericire, europenii nu se tem de schimbare, chiar dacă au străbătut decenii de presiuni ale „terorii fricii" nucleare, pe care o practica bipolaritatea Războiului Rece.
EUROPENII VOR SCHIMBARE
Dimpotrivă, europenii aşteaptă de multă vreme o schimbare adevarată, sistemică şi de substanţă, a Uniunii Europene, astfel încât ea să funcţioneze optim în plan intern şi să fie printre cei mai performanţi actori ai scenei internaţionale. Şi aceasta nu pentru orgolii sterile, ci cu scopul de a îmbunătăţi calitatea vieţii cetăţenilor europeni, dar şi pentru a se menţine în ritmul competitivităţii globale, pentru a produce mereu transformări benefice acasă şi în lume.
Şi cum nu ar dori europenii o asemenea atitudine transformaţionistă când blocarea acesteia a cauzat dezechilibrele care au dus la criza economico-financiară din ultimii ani? Când liderii politici şi economici din perioada care a premers crizei au simulat doar schimbări impuse de conjuncturalism, pentru a obţine timp şi a amăgi aşteptările cetăţenilor?
Sau, în plină criză internaţională, presaţi de spectrul dezastrelor economice şi sociale, s-au întrecut în promisiuni de a găsi noi şi valabile soluţii, dar au continuat să aplice aceleaşi politici şi tehnici de interese sectare, chiar dacă acestea poziţionau Uniunea Europeană în clase tot mai joase, comparativ cu principalii actori globali. Ori, când discursul multor lideri europeni propunea ţinuta populistă şi radicalismul în politică, întorcându-ne spre epoci istorice pe care credeam că nu le vom mai regăsi în prim-planul construcţiei societale şi europene, pervertind până şi acumulările democratice ale perioadei post-Războiul Rece şi barând orice formă de perfecţionare a democraţiei în secolul al XXI-lea.
O „PRIMAVARA EUROPEANA"
Uniunea Europeană trebuie să reintre grabnic în competiţia globală pentru progres, bunăstare şi performanţe în relaţiile sociale internaţionale/transnaţionale. Numai că, pentru aceasta, e absolut necesară o transformare a ei internă, să elimine toate barierele instituţionale, legale, procedurale şi politice care o ţin în blocajul din ultimii ani, în paralizia formalismului decizional interguvernamentalist.
Desigur, schimbările graduale, evoluţioniste sunt preferabile, dar ele ar fi eficiente numai dacă ar fi decise de către lideri credibili şi ar avea susţinerea cetăţenilor europeni, ar fi implementate spre binele/beneficiile tuturor. Altminteri, o „primăvară europeană" ar produce schimbări care, pentru un interval de timp, ar pune sub semnul întrebării însăşi experienţa construcţiei europene, aşa cum ea s-a profilat în peste o jumătate de veac.
UE SE SCHIMBĂ
Imobilismul social şi economic, politic nu poate fi acceptat la nesfârşit. Schimbările radicale şi bruşte crează atitudini radicale ulterioare, implică apoi o energie moderatoare. Îndeosebi azi, când deja ne-am obişnuit cu o acceleraţie sporită a evoluţiei sociale, liderii europeni şi ai statelor membre ale Uniunii Europene ar trebui să înţeleagă că schimbarea este în însăşi esenţa construcţiei şi integrării europene, că orice barieră în calea transformării şi perfecţionării Uniunii nu poate fi decât temporară, că până la urmă va fi înlăturată, chiar dacă va avea costuri neprevăzute. Asa că, aşteptăm să vedem, să analizăm şi să susţinem iniţiative valoroase ale Comisiei Europene, dar şi ale statelor membre, care să scoată Uniunea Europeană din ipostaza incertitudinilor care i-a măcinat, în anii din urmă, identitatea şi aspiraţiile.
http://youtu.be/T05cqHq0uFg
Preşedintele Parlamentului European, Martin Schulz, a declarat după întâlnirea cu noul premier Victor Ponta că este dreptul României să facă parte din spaţiul fără frontiere, un drept câştigat pe care eurodeputaţii îl vor susţine.
„România are dreptul să fie în Schenhen. Nu e o chestiune de binefacere", a spus Schulz.
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