"Cotitura istorică" de la Malta

I

Aurel I. Rogojan 

5-6 minutes

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Înainte de schimbarea lumii, președinții George Herbert Walter Bush și Mihail Sergheevici Gorbaciov au fost primiți în audiență de Papa Ioan Paul al II-lea.
În prima zi a lunii decembrie 1989, cu o zi înaintea întâlnirii cu președintele american George Herbert Walter Bush de la Malta, liderul sovietic Mihail Sergheevici Gorbaciov a avut o convorbire de 76 de minute cu Papa Ioan Paul al II-lea, durata audienței fiind apreciată ca extraordinară, ceea ce a stârnit și curiozități pe măsură în legătură cu problemele abordate. La un deceniu după întâlnire, New Catolic Service a făcut publică o parte a transcriptului convorbirii, cea a abordărilor generale, de neevitat, potrivit uzanțelor protocolare ale întâlnirilor la acest nivel: situația internațională, libertatea cultelor în Uniunea Sovietică.
Celălalt finalist din cursa Războiului Rece, George Herbert Walter Bush a avut audiența la Vatican pe data de 27 mai 1989. Interesant este ce a urmat acestei audiențe. Imediat după convorbirile avute cu Papa Ioan Paul al II-lea, președintele american s-a întâlnit cu cancelarul vest-german Helmuth Kohl, iar la Mainz a ținut un discurs prin care a anticipat agenda Conferinței de la Malta. În continuare, G.H.W. Bush s-a deplasat la Londra, iar în prima jumătate a lunii iulie la Varșovia, Gdansk și Budapesta.
„Miracolul” Wojtyla și Gorbaciov
Semnificațiile auspiciilor papale au fost rezumate de secretarul pentru Afaceri Externe al Vaticanului, cardinalul Agostino Casaroli, cu prilejul conferirii titlului de Doctor Honoris Causa al Universității din Cracovia, când a spus: „Miracolul rapidelor schimbări din Europa de Est poartă numele a două personalități fundamentale, Wojtyla și Gor­baciov („La Republica.it, 03 iunie 1990, „Miracolo all est grazie a Gorbaciov e Papa Wojtyla”). Și necesara completare lămuritoare: „Alla vigilia del vertice tra Gorbaciov e il presidente degli Stati Uniti d’America, George Bush, Wojtyla auspica che i prossimi colloqui possano portare a nuove intese, ispirate ad attento ascolto delle esigenze e delle attese dei popoli”.
Neîndoielnic, cei doi lideri și-au legat unele dintre angajamentele convenite în fața Papei Ioan Paul al II-lea, căci ulterior tot ceea ce a fost binecuvântat la Vatican a avut prioritate absolută. Vom reveni asupra consecințelor audiențelor papale.
În zilele de 2 și 3 decembrie 1989, Uniunea Sovietică a găzduit pe teritoriul său, reprezentat de crucișătorul Maxim Gorki ancorat în Golful Marsaxlokk, din portul orășelului maltez cu același nume, ceea ce istoria consemnează drept „Întâlnirea de la Malta”.
„Sfârşitul Războiului Rece”
Despre „Întâlnirea de la Malta”, M.S. Gorbaciov a spus, în cea mai pură expresie a jargonului kremlinez, că a reprezentat „o cotitură istorică”. Semnificația formală cotiturii istorice, cea destinată viitorimii, a fost dăltuită, în limbile malteză, engleză și rusă, în piatra nobilă a plăcii Monumentului Bush/Gorbachev cold war Memorial ridicat pe faleza orăşelului Birzebbuga (cca. 8 kilometri de capitala La Valleta): „Malta 2–3 decembrie 1989, George Bush, Michael Gorbachev” „Sfârşitul Războiului Rece”.
La momentul întâlnirii, M.S. Gorbaciov își îndeplinise în proporție de 75% angajamentul prealabil privind înlăturarea de la putere a ultimilor patru lideri comuniști rămași pe poziții împotriva valului. Generalii din sistemele de putere secretă ale R.D. Germană, Cehoslovaciei și Bulgariei la care directorul K.G.B.-ului, Vladimir Kriucikov, a făcut apel pentru scoaterea din conservare a opozanților lui Erich Honeker, Gustav Husak și Todor Jivkov s-au dovedit eficienți și loiali Moscovei.
Generalii Moscovei de la București, marionete naive
Generalii Moscovei de la București, marionete naive ale unor tentative anterioare de puciuri de operetă, lamentabil eșuate, nu mai aveau conexiunile și nici credibilitatea necesare.

Încercările generalilor Nicolae Militaru și Nicolae Doicaru, dar și ale altor generali și înalți ofițeri, cu angajamente de agenți ai K.G.B./G.R.U., ca și cele ale „civilului” Virgil Măgureanu (alias căpitanul Mihăilă Mihai din rezerva Centrului de Informații Extene, denumirea serviciul extern de spionaj al Departamentului Securității Statului), de a racola înalți decidenți ai Armatei și Securității au clacat. Ei erau, mai demult, motani cu clopoței. Pentru intrarea lor în rol, seviciile speciale ale Uniunii Sovietice, Ungariei, R.D. Germania, R.S.F. Iugoslavia, Poloniei, Cehoslovaciei și Bulgariei (n.n. – chiar și mai înainte, cu Jivkov la putere!), în consens cu servicii speciale occidentale, au instrumentalizat planul unei revolte populare dublate de un puci militar. În teoria loviturii de stat, formele de realizare a acesteia sunt revoluția, puciul militar și revolta populară.

II

Aurel I. Rogojan 

7-9 minutes

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În zilele de 2 și 3 decembrie 1989, Uniunea Sovietică a găzduit pe teritoriul său, reprezentat de crucișătorul Maxim Gorki ancorat în Golful Marsaxlokk, din portul orășelului maltez cu același nume, ceea ce istoria consemnează drept „Întâlnirea de la Malta”.
La momentul întâlnirii, M.S. Gorbaciov își îndeplinise în proporție de 75% angajamentul prealabil privind înlăturarea de la putere a ultimilor patru lideri comuniști rămași pe poziții împotriva valului.
Generalii din sistemele de putere secretă ale R.D. Germană, Cehoslovaciei și Bulgariei la care directorul K.G.B.-ului, Vladimir Kriucikov, a făcut apel pentru scoaterea din conservare a opozanților lui Erich Honeker, Gustav Husak și Todor Jivkov, s-au dovedit eficienți și loiali Moscovei.
Şeful KGB l-a debarcat pe Erich Honecker
Rezidentul-șef al KGB-ului în Germania de Est, generalul Ivan Nikolaevici Kuzmin, în calitate de martor ocular al evenimentelor petrecute în Republica Democrată Germană în anul 1989, arată că anterior vizitei lui Gorbaciov în această țară, prilejuită de aniversarea a 40 de ani de la înființarea statului est-german, rezidența trebuia să pună la dispoziția Moscovei două documente: „Informare operativă asupra situației din conducerea Partidului Socialist Unit German“ și „Sinteza privind starea de spirit din Partidului Socialist Unit German“. Din ambele documente, fără a se recomanda expres, fiindcă KGB-ului nu-i era permis să se amestece în procesul deciziilor politice, rezultă necesitatea demiterii secretarului general Honecker din toate funcțiile de partid și de stat.
Premierul Willi Stoph și Erich Mielke, șeful STASI, dar și altii, l-au rugat pe Gorbaciov să-i sprijine în opoziția lor față de Honecker. Rugămintea acestora era, de fapt, corolarul celor două rapoarte ale K.G.B.-ului. Gorbaciov nu le-a răspuns. Vladimir Kriucikov și-a asumat personal înlăturarea lui Honecker, iar cine trebuia i-a tălmăcit lui Willi Stoph ce semnifică tăcerea în astfel de împrejurări, adică acord fără rezerve.
La 17 octombrie, Erich Mielke, șeful STASI, a propus Biroului Politic eliberarea lui Honecker din toate funcțiile deținute, ceea ce s-a acceptat imediat. A doua zi, noul secretar general era Egon Krenz, fost secretar al Comitetului Central și șef al Secției C.C. al P.S.U.G. pentru armată, interne, securitate, procuratură și justiție. I-au succedat, la scurt timp, Hans Modrow și Gregor Gyusi.
Iluziile Moscovei
11.03.1985 este data la care agentul schimbării, Mihail Sergheevici Gorbaciov, și-a intrat în rol și niciun alt lider est-european nu a mai contat.
Faptul că Honecker a fost schimbat ca urmare a dorinței lui Gorbaciov este fără echivoc exprimat de ambasadorul de atunci la Bonn al URSS, Kwitinski, care ulterior a afirmat: „Moscova și-a făcut iluzii că era suficient să-l înlocuiască pe Honecker și totul va fi în regulă…”.
Gorbaciov – în discuțiile cu Egon Krenz, iar mai apoi cu succesorul acestuia, Gregor Gysi – împărtășea un optimism exagerat, ca și cum nu ar fi primit și nu ar fi citit informațiile transmise de rezidența KGB din Berlinul de Est și, în fapt, de aparatul împuternicit al KGB-ului din RDG (din care făcea parte și Vladimir Putin).
Aparenta surprindere a lui Gorbaciov
Evenimentele ulterioare, respectiv căderea zidului Berlinului, i-ar fi surprins atât pe Gorbaciov, cât și KGB-ul. În următoarele 3–4 zile, rezidența KGB a pregătit o evaluare și o prognosticare a situației, raportul fiind transmis în seara zilei de 13 octombrie 1989. Evaluarea nu a fost acceptată, fiind clasată cu rezoluția „excesiv defetistă“. Peste șase zile, când s-a cerut un nou raport, evenimentele depășiseră și cele mai sumbre previziuni. În locul Ministerului Securității Statului, Camera Populară a RDG a înființat Oficiul pentru Securitatea Națională, iar la 3 decembrie, o nouă surpriză, înlăturarea lui Egon Krenz, a semnificat falimentul politicii reformatoare, așa cum fusese gândită de Gorbaciov.
Centrul KGB de la Karhorst și-a încetat, în cursul lunii decembrie, activitatea de legătură cu serviciile locale. Documentele operative și de informații au fost inventariate și trimise la Moscova, iar celelalte distruse pe loc.
Amplă operaţiune sub drapel străin a KGB-ului
Cum s-a ajuns în această situație, aproape pe neașteptate? În realitate, scenariul evenimentelor din R.D. Germană, în mod special, precum și evoluțiile care s-au girat prin gentlemen’s agreementul de la Malta au fost anticipate și puse în operă la ordinul lui Iuri Vladimirovici Andropov, fost director al KGB (1967-1982), secretar general al PCUS (1982-1983). Andropov a inițiat o amplă operațiune clandestină sub steaguri străine, cunoscută doar de trei persoane din Departamentul Ilegali al KBG, cu scopul de a se putea prelua sub control alternativele la regimurile totalitare comuniste.
Stricta compartimentare a operațiunii a facilitat autonomizarea nucleelor operaționale, acestea acționând independent, cu autofinanțare și fără legături cu Moscova, care depistate ar fi putut compromite scopul urmărit. Aceasta a fost partea clandestină a schimbării în care și Gorbaciov a avut un rol, considerat de el și de istorici ca fiind misiunea unuia dintre giganții secolului al XX-lea, care au schimbat lumea.
Pentru scenariștii și regizorii din umbra evenimentelor, toți actorii acestora au fost exact ceea ce era trebuincios schimbării direcției date istoriei prin experimentul revoluționar din anul 1917, brutal extins în anul 1945, în numele victoriei asupra nazismului, până în inima Europei, cu permanente pericole pentru ordinea democratică occidentală din Spania, Portugalia, Italia, Franța.
Ulterior, în anii ‚70, Moscova a devenit influentă în Somalia, Etiopia, Cambogia, Vietnam, Mozambic, Angola, Laos, Afghanistan.
Nimic nu a fost neplanificat în 1989

Agentul schimbării, Mihail Sergheevici Gorbaciov, și-a intrat în rol la 11 martie 1985, dată de la care niciun alt lider est-european nu a mai contat.
Începând cu anul 1989, emisari ai lui Gorbaciov – îndeosebi șeful KGB, Vladimir Kriucikov, dar și alții cu legături ori antecedente în KGB – au trecut la scoaterea din conservare a unei rețele, până atunci pasivă, de opozanți ai liderilor de partid și de stat aflați la putere în țările socialiste central și est-europene, fiind stabilit modul în care aceștia vor asigura transferul puterii către așa-zișii reformiști.
Schimbarea lui Erich Honecker a fost rezervată lui Vladimir Kriucikov. Acesta din urmă a efectuat cel puțin trei călătorii în Germania de Est, din care una secretă, pentru a putea avea convorbiri cu reprezentanți ai „opoziției“, printre care și cu profesorul Manfred von Ardenne.
Amploarea manifestațiilor declanșate imediat după ce Gorbaciov și ceilalți lideri comuniști est-europeni au părăsit Germania de Est, unde participaseră la cea de-a 40-a aniversare a creării RDG-ului, a creat climatul propice înlăturării lui Honecker. Numai că în locul lui nu a venit, așa cum era așteptat, reformatorul Hans Modrow, ci Egon Krenz, omul KGB-ului, susținut de Kriucikov. Egon Krenz pare să fi fost însă depășit și speriat de evenimente, scăpând situația de sub control. Deciziile sale, luate fără a se mai consulta cu Moscova, l-au surprins, chipurile, și pe Gorbaciov. Nimic nu a fost însă neplanificat, ori fără pachetul complet al soluțiilor alternative.
În realitate, scenariul evenimentelor din R.D. Germană, în mod special, precum și evoluțiile care s-au girat prin gentlemen’s agreementul de la Malta au fost anticipate și puse în operă la ordinul lui Iuri Vladimirovici Andropov, fost director al KGB și secretar general al PCUS.

III

Aurel I. Rogojan 

9-11 minutes

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În zilele de 2 și 3 decembrie 1989, Uniunea Sovietică a găzduit pe teritoriul său, reprezentat de crucișătorul Maxim Gorki ancorat în Golful Marsaxlokk, din portul orășelului maltez cu același nume, ceea ce istoria consemnează drept „Întâlnirea de la Malta“. Despre „Întâlnirea de la Malta“ cu președintele George H.W. Bush, M.S. Gorbaciov a spus, în cea mai pură expresie a jargonului kremlinez, că a reprezentat „o cotitură istorică“.
La momentul întâlnirii, M.S. Gorbaciov își îndeplinise în proporție de 75% angajamentul prealabil privind înlăturarea de la putere a ultimilor patru lideri comuniști rămași pe poziții împotriva valului.
Moscova, refuzată de protagoniștii „Primăverii de la Praga“
În Cehoslovacia, ramura locală a KGB-ului din cadrul Securității Statului – STB – a încercat readucerea în actualitate a unora dintre protagoniștii „Primăverii de la Praga“, brutal reprimată de intervenția militară a Forțelor Armate ale tratatului de la Varșovia (fără participarea României). Alexander Dubcek și fostul său ministru Zdenek Mlynar au fost contactați la Viena, dar aceștia, sub amintirea încă vie a evenimentelor din august 1968, refuză orice angajament. Alții însă se vor constitui într-un grup care s-a grăbit să ajungă la Moscova pentru convorbiri cu Mihail Gorbaciov. Acesta îi expediază repede la… KGB! KGB-ul îi pune la dispoziția șefului STB, generalul Alois Lorenc.
Ca și lui Todor Jivkov, şi lui Nicolae Ceauşescu i-a fost adresată, în luna martie 1989, o scrisoare deschisă în care, printre alte grave acuze, i se imputa prăbuşirea economică a României. Nu poate fi chiar o coincidenţă întâmplătoare…
„Turiștii sovietici“ din Cehoslovacia
În preajma zilei de 17 noiembrie 1989, la Praga au sosit, cu câteva avioane, „trupe profesioniste de revoluționari“, adică turiști sovietici din formațiunile „SPETSNAZ“ ale GRU, care s-au amestecat printre demonstranți. Un locotenent al STB, Ludek Zvicak, a fost infiltrat între demonstranți sub identitatea tânărului praghez Martin Smid, în ipostaza de element provocator, care să atace baricadele miliției. A fost împușcat… Vestea morții lui Smid face ocolul lumii, iar mulțimile stârnite nu mai părăsesc străzile. „Turiștii“ sovietici au plecat fără să mai aștepte deznodământul final.
Reporterii occidentali se înființează la domiciliul lui Smid, iar acesta apare acasă viu și nevătămat. Prea târziu însă. Efectul scontat al diversiunii se împlinise. Revoluția învinsese. Un general trimis de Kriucikov, de la Moscova, Viktor Gruskov, generalul Teslenko, șeful antenei KGB de la Praga, și generalul Alois Lorenc au supravegheat întreaga desfășurare a evenimentelor.
„Revoluția de catifea“, declanșată de KGB
Președintele Havel a afirmat categoric că „Revoluția de catifea“ de la Praga, din 17 noiembrie 1989, a fost declanșată de KGB. Havel a definit această operațiune drept „un complot pentru abolirea regimului comunist“, condus de brejnevistul Gustav Husak. Complotiștii, potrivit lui Havel, s-au folosit de protestele studenților pentru a ridica noul regim în șa și pentru a realiza reforma de tip gorbaciovist.
Tot Havel a mai dezvăluit că, inițial, s-a dorit aducerea la putere a unui membru al cabinetului Dubcek (din 1968), aflat în exil la Viena, dar acesta a declinat oferta. Mărturisirea lui Havel de la BBC a fost apoi reluată, în rezumat, și în Die Welt, fiind susținută ulterior și prin alte dovezi.
Generalul Alois Lorenc vizitase anterior Moscova, unde a fost pregătit pentru viitoarele evenimente, iar generalul Viktor Grușko a adus cu sine comandouri Spetznaz ale GRU. Ofițerii Spetznaz, care de la aeroportul Ruzine se împrăștiaseră în toată Praga, conform planului, l-au ținut permanent la curent pe general cu mersul „revoluției“. Un aspect interesant, semnalat de corespondenții străini: milițienii praghezi care s-au manifestat inițial extrem de violent față de manifestanți au dispărut apoi pur și simplu, lăsând bulevardele în mâna manifestanților. Pentru mulți corespondenți străini, violența inițială neobișnuită a miliției pragheze a avut un caracter provocator, deliberat. În noaptea de 17 noiembrie 1989, generalul Grușko și echipa sa au părăsit Praga, la fel de discret precum apăruseră.
Sofia – complot al nomenclaturii cu binecuvântarea Kremlinului
Prima lovitură pentru Todor Jivkov, aflat la putere de 33 de ani, a venit din partea Turciei, care a suspendat deschiderea graniţei pentru emigranţii turcofoni care părăseau Bulgaria. Imediat au intrat în scenă, devenind şi foarte active, două mişcări ecologiste, „Ecoforum“ şi „Ekoglasnost“, astfel încât, spre sfârşitul lunii august, era vehiculată ideea unei iminente lovituri de palat. În spatele complotului se aflau generalul KGB Sarapov, noul ambasador al Uniunii Sovietice la Sofia, ministrul de externe Petăr Mladenov (n. 22 august 1936 – d. 31 mai 2000) şi Andrei Lukanov (1938, Moscova – 1996, Sofia), ministrul Relaţiilor economice externe. Opoziţia din afara nomenclaturii nu conta însă decât pentru imaginea externă. Todor Jivkov era izolat, fără recunoaştere în relaţiile externe, Bulgaria fiind reprezentată de cei doi complotişti.
„Scrisoarea celor șase“ în varianta bulgară
În Bulgaria, debarcarea lui Todor Jivkov a fost încredințată lui Sarapov, noul ambasador al URSS la Sofia. Anterior, generalul Sarapov deținuse responsabilități însemnate în KGB, fiind și directorul cabinetului lui Andropov.
În 24 octombrie 1989, Petăr Mladenov îi adresează o scrisoare deschisă lui Todor Jivkov, aducându-i, între altele, critici aspre pentru prăbuşirea economiei (n.n. – şi lui Nicolae Ceauşescu i-a fost adresată, în luna martie 1989, o scrisoare deschisă, în care, printre alte grave acuze, i se imputa prăbuşirea economică a României. Nu poate fi chiar o coincidenţă întâmplătoare…). Mladenov şi-a prezentat demisia, dar Jivkov a amânat punerea ei în discuţia Biroului Politic al Partidului Comunist Bulgar.
17.11.1989 – ziua Revoluției de Catifea, declanșată de KGB și considerată de Vaclav Havel drept „un complot pentru abolirea regimului comunist“
Tabăra pro-Gorbaciov a jucat cartea ecologistă
Iniţial, mişcările de stradă au fost timide şi cu participare redusă. Prima demonstrație anticomunistă la Sofia a avut loc pe data de 3 noiembrie 1989. În fapt, circa 5.000 de ecologiști au scandat „Democrație“ și „Transparență“, în drum spre Adunarea populară, unde au înmânat o petiție împotriva realizării proiectului hidroenergetic Rila, considerat dăunător mediului. Acțiunea nu a putut fi oprită, întrucât a coincis cu intensificarea presiunilor externe pentru democratizare.
În istoria oficială, drept început al schimbărilor democratice este menționată data de 10 noiembrie, când, în cadrul unei plenare a Comitetului Central al Partidului Comunist Bulgar, liderii pro-gorbacioviști l-au trimis la pensie, cu mulțumirile de rigoare, pe Todor Jivkov. Acesta începuse să-şi citească imperturbabil raportul, când premierul Atanasov se urcă la tribună pentru a propune retragerea lui Jivkov din funcţiile deţinute şi candidatura lui Mladenov. Ambele propuneri sunt aprobate fără probleme.
Ambasadorul sovietic Sarapov se întâlneşte imediat cu Jivkov, în timp ce Mladenov ia legătura cu Gorbaciov, care-l felicită. Ambasadorul american la Sofia, Sol Polanski (1926-2016), cu o zi înainte, raportase Departamentului de Stat că nu se aşteaptă la niciun fel de schimbări importante la Plenara Comitetului Central din 10 noiembrie, subliniind că „nimeni nu este pregătit să-i arunce o provocare lui Jivkov“. Când semna telegrama redactată de „diplomatul de la CIA“, Biroul Politic, fără participarea lui Jivkov, votase eliminarea acestuia.
Modelul „ex-sovietic“ al tranziției în Bulgaria
Spre deosebire de țările central-europene, în Bulgaria regimul a fost mai puternic, iar presiunile din partea unor grupuri de disidenți – mai slabe. În aceste condiții, rezistența anticomunistă a adoptat forme de luptă ecologiste. Doar după căderea lui Jivkov, la Sofia au început mari demonstrații de stradă și mitinguri, prin care se cerea abrogarea primului articol din Constituție care proclama rolul conducător al Partidului Comunist Bulgar.
Începutul tranziției a urmat modelul fostelor republici sovietice – nu cel al țărilor central-europene. Noul președinte Petăr Mladenov a promis transparență și perestroika. În primii ani tranziția a fost controlată de nomenclatura comunistă, cu ajutorul unor grupări create de securitate. Președintele și liderul partidului, Petăr Mladenov, a fost nevoit să demisioneze după ce a amenințat opoziția cu venirea tancurilor.
În ianuarie 1990, Jivkov a fost pus sub arest la domiciliu. Ulterior, partidul comunist s-a rebotezat ca partid socialist. Tranziția după modelul perestroikist deformează și șterge memoria colectivă despre comunism, care, negat de peste 70% din populaţie în anul 1991, devine dorit de 55% în anul 2007. O posibilă explicație pentru sentimentele pesimiste constă în faptul că în Bulgaria schimbarea a fost dominată de nomenclatura comunistă. Dar Bulgaria nu este nici pe departe un caz singular!

Din gura lumii: Statul subteran – mit sau realitate?

popescu 

Positionen 15: Der Tiefe Staat – Mythos oder Wirklichkeit? 

Noi nu avem nici un post tv si mai ales jurnalisti. Nu aflati nimic de la acestia, deoarece sint inchisi intr-o nisa interna, care le taie orizontul pina aproape de nas. Lipsa lor de experienta este cronica. Tinind cont de ceea ce s-a intimplat intre 1930-1970, era putin probabil sa fie altfel. Se putea remedia, dar aceasta situatie cerea o mare deschidere din partea unor oameni care, datorita unor carente de caracter, nu sint in stare de asemenea fapte. Egoismul si fudulia maririi ii impiedica sa ajunga la un nivel care sa le permita o alta viziune, respectiv o alta intelegere a evenimentelor pe care le vad.
Poate incercati sa vedeti aceasta emisiune si, daca veti reusi, veti constata un nivel al discutiilor la care noi nu putem ajunge. Romanul nou nu vrea sa invete nimic, isi doreste doar comfort si prefera spatiile mici. Ca asta inseamna pierderi si situatii care pot deveni periculoase, nu-l intereseaza, in primul rind pentru ca nu le poate percepe ca atare.
Am ajuns o natie lipsita de coloana vertrebrala si ne comportam ca atare. Cine ne-ar respcta si care ar fi motivul?!
Cine este Danile Ganser, unul dintre participantii la discutie:
https://www.danieleganser.ch/
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Daniele_Ganser

László Bogár & Raoul Weiss

“They will have to unite the German, Italian and French budgets, otherwise the euro will fall” – 1/2

24-31 minutes

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Interview with László Bogár, economist and university professor, former MP and former State Secretary of Hungary, publicist: “They will have to unite the German, Italian and French budgets, otherwise the euro will fall.”
Part 1/2.
At the end of November 2018, Raoul Weiss met with László Bogár in Budapest for a interview without taboos on economical topics. László Bogár is since the regime change a well-known Hungarian economist: he is one the economists who shaped the Fidesz’ economical policy. Author of 28 books, László Bogár has been State Secretary for political questions of the Ministry of foreign trade relations from 1990 to 1994 and State Secretary at the Office of the Prime Minister under Orbán’s first mandate, from 1998 to 2002. Very critical of the current capitalistic system and of the EU’s evolution, László Bogár is a shining example of what is a Central European “illiberal” economist.

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Raoul Weiss: On the euro crisis: whether in Strasbourg or Budapest, everyone is talking about the so-called “migration rights” all the time, but some suggest that these big moral questions also serve as a screen for financial worries, which would – among other things – give rise to the tensions which could recently be seen in Brussels and Strasbourg; the same malicious gossip also states that, faced with the financial losses implied by BREXIT, Germany would like to pass on the bill to others: either to its broke clients in Latin Europe, and / or its subcontractors in Central Europe. In your opinion, what would be the most intelligent strategy from the German point of view? And, among the subsets of German-owned states – the Latin countries on the one hand, and Central Europe on the other –, which do you think is capable of the greatest resistance? Or, to put it more simply: if the Germans do not want to pay, who will pay?
László Bogár: I would like to begin my answer by sketching a vast historical panorama in the background. Whatever one thinks of it, it is clear that in past centuries, the West has always been the seat of a world empire. This is particularly clear in the case of the Portuguese, Spanish, Dutch, French and British empires: each of these nations held the empire of the world for more or less a century; and, once almost all Western nation-states have had their more or less 100 years of world power (this periodicity of 100 years, by the way, is quite interesting in itself), the time has come to transfer the empire beyond the ocean, to the United States of America founded in the meantime there, as a pseudo-nation-state, but which does also function as a nation-state. And that century is the one we live in. Though it will probably come to an end soon: if the empire mutates every 100 years, then America too, within twenty years, might enter its twilight zone. The most important thing is to understand that the world currency is always the currency of the Western nation-state which assumes the role of vector of the world empire, and which, ipso facto, always shows a dual structure: while remaining a nation-state, it simultaneously becomes the structural base of a world empire. Even afterwards, the trace of this structure remains engraved in it, the best example being from this point of view that of the British Empire: even as long as Great Britain remained a member of the European Union (which is still the case as I speak), it never considered for one minute giving up the sterling – a former world currency – in favour of the euro.
I imagine that the reader will not need long explanations to understand what an immense advantage a given nation can find in the fact that its national currency is at the same time the world currency. Indeed, by simplifying to the extreme, it meant, in the case of America in the 1960s and 1970s, that when the empire needed money – for example to wage a war in Vietnam, which cost in the $ 5,000 billion, and the final bill is not yet issued, since pensions are still being paid to veterans – it just printed all the money it needed, while passing the bill to the rest of the world. Indeed, as long as the dollar represented between 90 and 95% of world monetary reserves – a situation that did not change until the end of the 1980s – only Charles de Gaulle dared to provoke the system, an audacity for which, by the way, he paid the highest price: in 1967 he demanded restitution of French gold, in 1968 he got a civil war for good measure, in 1969 he resigned, and died in 1970. In 1971, under a secret agreement passed with Saudi Arabia, it was decided that in the future, the Empire would whack all those who would try to trade oil in currencies other than the dollar. After which the price of oil was multiplied by 12, so that Western Europe would soon no longer need to wonder what to do with its tons of dollars, being forced to use them for its oil purchases.
That’s how the world really works. What is important to understand in this story is that, no matter how loudly the masters of the world accuse us of believing in “conspiracy theories”, what we are really witnessing is a conspiracy practice. (…) What must be remembered is that the current world empire will always do everything in its power to keep its status as long as possible, considering the extraordinary opportunities yielded by the control of the world currency. As we speak, a little less than 60% of the world’s reserves are still in dollars, which is a huge drop from 95%, but still quite a big proportion.
Raoul Weiss: De Gaulle famously called this the “exorbitant privilege”. [Erratum: these words were those of Valéry Giscard-d’Estaing, then Minister of Finance; It is frequently mis-attributed to Charles de Gaulle, who is said to have had similar views, Ed.]
László Bogár: Indeed, that phrase goes straight to the point. As far as the euro is concerned, its status stems from a deeper problem. In drawing up the list of nation-states called to lead the empire, one cannot fail to notice that, after the Portuguese, the Spanish, the Dutch, the French and the British, the Germans did not have their turn. During the twentieth century, Germany twice tried to capture the world’s empire for one hundred years. During the two World Wars (which I usually call “projects”: two projects of the global system of financial domination), the global system of financial domination – the true masters of the world – sent very clear signs to Germany, to make it understand the following message: “You will never have the empire of the world. We recognize your talent, your zeal, your enormous technological superiority, but you will never have it, not even for 100 years, not even temporarily”. That’s why the real story of the 70 years following the Second World War is that of the constant efforts of the American world empire to reduce Germany’s room for manoeuvre … (…) [To parody the title of a] famous film from the Czech New Wave – Closely Watched Trains – one could say that those 70 years were years of Closely Watched Germany. On the cultural level, it was brutally tamed. The message was clear: “You have no past, no culture, no history – everything that is about identity is strictly forbidden to you”. And I just said the key word: this whole story revolves around identity. The purpose of this world-dominating power is to strip people – individuals as well as communities of various sizes, up to entire nations – of their identities, to dissolve them in what I usually call “scraping of diluted multiculturalism”, the only attitude in which they become harmless from the point of view of the system. Anyone who has an identity is dangerous, because the very basis of human happiness is that I know who I am, and no matter what hardships and sufferings I have to go through, I know why I am confronting them – hence, I am someone. It is the only possible way of existence, both for individuals and for human communities of all sizes. This is what this invisible global system, which keeps denying its own existence, is trying to crush. Unfortunately, it seems to me that this crushing has been a success in the case of Germany; its disastrous demographic figures, in particular, show how far the Germans have disintegrated from a spiritual, moral and intellectual point of view. In parallel, of course, Germany as a capital structure has won gigantic victories during these 70 years. It sometimes even managed to let America behind on the podium of world exports (…). Even as I speak, the race is very tight; despite a huge difference in the size of the two countries, Germany’s exports almost match those of the United States of America. It’s a gigantic performance.
And in my opinion, this is where we come to the point: for me, the euro is for Germany a kind of consolation prize. It had to renounce the empire of the world, but at least it got the right to coin a vice-world-currency. For me, the euro is the deutschmark of the fourth German Reich. Of course, it is forbidden to name this fourth Reich by this name – especially because it follows the Third Reich … And the whole point is that for the American empire, more and more pushed into its entrenchments, sinking more and more into chaos, the euro becomes more and more of an obstacle. The empire would like to see the euro collapse as soon as possible, because it becomes a competitor. 25% of the world’s monetary reserves are in euros. Third place is the sterling, followed by the yen and the Swiss franc, but all of these haves shares around 3 or 4%. The rest is not even worth mentioning – including China, with its yuan to be around 2.8%. Only the euro is able to challenge the dollar: the more or less 60% of the latter and the 25 or 26% of the euro belong to the same scale. The amount of reserves in euros is close to half that of reserves expressed in dollars. This is all the more depressing for the American empire, as the latter also loses ground in other areas, which makes it less and less able to retain its global power, and plunges into a more and more serious funding crisis – since all the expenses of the American empire are paid by the American nation-state. The empire does not have a de iure budget – so, of course, the bill is passed to the nation-state. But the Iowa farmer does not really understand why his country has an annual military budget of $ 1000 billion, while no one in this world is threatening him – and while will categorically refuse to protect him against what does threaten him. For example: migrations.
Raoul Weiss: But one may wonder to what extent Germany is really determined to resist, given that the German nation-state would like to have an empire, but is reluctant to bear the cost …
László Bogár: It is what the Germans of today would like, as well as Germany, as part of the global capital structure, as well as this German society, which still enjoys a good share of well-being – they would desire this imperial status. Maybe I wouldn’t dare to say that Germany does not want to pay the price; I have rather the impression that it lacks the courage to admit that, in order to defend her imperial candidacy, they would be obliged to confront the American empire. This is where the limit of German daring lies. Germany would like to step forward, but cannot even imagine what this confrontation could mean. First, let us not forget that in the 1970s, Germany was the scene of numerous political assassinations: high-ranking personalities (for example the director of Dresdner Bank [it seems that László Bogár is referring to Alfred Herrhausen, then director of the Deutsche Bank, or to Jürgen Ponto, spokesperson of the Dresdner Bank, Ed.] ) were slaughtered in the middle of the street, and the murderers were never caught. The German elites then felt that the empire, if it feels the need to punish them, can resort to quite brutal methods, so that they do not wish to renew the experience of such a confrontation. To some extent, the deepest sense of the migration crisis is that the American empire wants to ruin the whole of Europe, and would be glad to see the euro weakened or exploding – which would automatically free some ground for the dollar, even if the result is no more than a procrastination of the fall. The explosion of the euro would also have extremely serious consequences for Germany. Admittedly, the most serious consequences – a detail of great importance – would be in southern Europe. Behind the disastrous situation of southern Europe, however, we find – and this a very sensitive issue, a point on which one cannot insist too much – the greed of German economic and political elites. Indeed, those 2500 billion euros of Italian government debt include the result of huge Italian trade deficits vis-à-vis Germany, of which the latter has benefited hugely. In other words: to keep control of the German imperial mark, the currency of the Fourth Reich, also implies responsibilities. If the European Union was a unitary empire, the problem would not even arise. Within the United States of America, for example, it is not even possible to measure the exact share of Iowa or Kansas in federal debt.

László Bogár (on the Left) and Raoul Weiss (on the Right) in Budapest, November 2018. Photo: Visegrád Post

Raoul Weiss: There is already some talk about a Franco-German joint parliament. It does not exist yet, but it is already all over the media. But where is the common budget? Macron has indeed made such a proposal to Merkel, but all Merkel seems willing to grant is a tiny fraction of the requested sums…
László Bogár: There is no alternative. They will have to unite the German, Italian and French budgets, otherwise the euro will fall. Spoken today, this sentence may have accents of political science-fiction, and the German elite may choose to say “no, I do not accept that” – but then the euro is over. In that case, their calculation would be the following: let the euro sink, even then, Germany will still be, in a way, the master of Europe – yes, but the master of such a Europe in which not only Italy, but also France are sinking into utter chaos. Here is the choice in relation to which the Germans must now weigh the pros and the cons: openly assume their will to operate a world empire of Europe, so that this empire can survive, with the euro, or let down the whole thing, in which case it will explode, which in the medium term will of course have catastrophic consequences first for the French, Italian and all of southern Europe, but will eventually not spare Germany either. They will soon have to decide. The American empire is banking on the collapse of the euro, which would favour its business. And there is also a certain part of the German elite secretly thinking: “Let’s dump that shit – at least, it will be a good riddance”. But the reason for this is that the German elites have not yet got a clear idea of the size of the wounds that a total explosion of the euro could inflict to Germany in the medium term. I think that the coming years will be critical – say: the next five years, during which the German elite will have to choose. And, from this point of view, it will be very important to know who will succeed Merkel as Chancellor – (…) This gentleman Merz, who was Wolfgang Schäuble’s man – and, through Schäuble, in fact, a Helmut Kohl guy –, one can suspect in what direction he is going. I suspect that he might be able to understand the problem in all its magnitude, whereas, as regards the other candidates, I’m really not sure that they would be able to decipher the situation. No one can say today what would be Merz’s answer if he ever had to face the problem as a Chancellor, but he, at least, would be able to understand the problem itself, and to make the German elites understand it. Merz also comes off a defeat in the first round of the competition for the presidency of the CDU – which could ultimately turn out to his advantage. But I think that the decisive choice will be made within the next five years, and that it will be of paramount importance: the future of the whole of Europe – for, say, fifty years – will be determined by the capacity that [Merkel’s] successor will have – or not – to understand the nature of the situation and to provide such a strategic response that represents a lesser evil for Europe. We are a little short of good solutions.
Raoul Weiss: Let’s go back to the euro – or rather, to the forint. In France, today, many describe the euro as a trap. Assuming that it would also have been a trap for Hungary – which is not certain, as the initial parameters were quite different – we might say that Hungary managed to avoid the trap. There remains, however, the question of how far this preserved forint guarantees the monetary independence of Hungary – or, to phrase it very plainly: is the forint really Hungarian money?
László Bogár: There is a Hungarian saying – full of that bitter irony that characterizes us – according to which the only problem with the Hungarian National Bank is that it is not Hungarian, nor national, nor even a bank; in fact, it is the Hungarian local branch of the global financial power. This is a consequence of the dogma of the “independence” of central banks, which the liberal indoctrination has been inculcating to the Hungarian public by means of a gigantic media arsenal – the dogma states that the HNB has to be independent, that is to say that it should not depend on the Hungarian people and the strategic interests of Hungary. Nowadays, thank God, the Hungarian public discourse has been able to decode this idea, and people now see exactly what this “independence” really means: the obligation to serve the interests of the global financial power, starting with the first of them: siphoning out of Hungary – partly through exchange rates, partly in the form of interest on state debt – as much resources as possible. Concretely: the interests on Hungarian state obligations, which mostly leave the country, must be as high as possible, and the exchange rates, as little favourable as possible for Hungary. This is the real cause of the most serious conflicts which Viktor Orbán’s governments had to face over the last eight years, and it is highly likely that these conflicts – as the recent debates in the European Parliament – will only intensify in the near future, especially during the months before the European elections, but also afterwards. They are largely rooted in the fact that Viktor Orbán is one of those – still very few – European politicians who have identified this problem.
A famous Hungarian thinker of the twentieth century, István Bibó, said that the weakness of the Hungarian spirit is that it produces on the one hand hypertensive realists, who see what’s at stake in the world of their time, but do not know how to react to it and therefore prefer to take refuge in a posture of prophets, an ivory tower; on the other hand, false pragmatists, who adopt a cynical attitude of saying: “Come on, whether we like it or not, we will have to serve the world empire no matter who holds it, so why worry? The best way to help ourselves is to help the Empire” – except, of course, that, in doing so, they act against the interests of the majority of the people.
Raoul Weiss: The Gyurcsány type [Ferenc Gyurcsány, left-wing liberal, was Prime Minister of Hungary from 2004 to 2009, Ed.].
László Bogár: Indeed. And this is what makes Bibó say that what we would need are pragmatic realists: men able to understand the issues, to see that their homeland is cornered, but also to have a pragmatic conception, based on the idea that there is always a minimum of leeway: “Let’s try to loosen the noose!” And here is the origin of the conflict: nowadays, even such a search of a minimal leeway is perceived as a terrorist attack by the system of global financial domination.
Raoul Weiss: They got you rid of the IMF.
László Bogár: Yes, and to do that, it was even necessary to change the director of the central bank. Obviously, the Prime Minister and the head of the central bank have to work in tandem, in the closest possible collaboration, even perfectly synchronizing their communication. And everything seems to indicate that in the last eight years – at the cost of enormous risks, tensions and conflicts – Hungary has succeeded – as is now generally admitted – to reach a much more favourable financial situation than ten years ago. And the lesson this teaches us seem to be that, even if the leeway is not huge, even if it implies considerable risks – provided, of course, that the circumstances make it possible – fortune smiles on the audacious. This is why it takes a great deal of courage, intellectual courage, knowledge and determination for a politician to truly act as a responsible statesman, to be more than just a globalist collaborator – even though, obviously, some level of collaboration is always unavoidable. Indeed, direct confrontation does not make any sense either. But, that being said, the leeway does exist, and it is a fact that today, Hungary is more or less out of the trap, and enjoys some level of freedom. We remain, of course, subject to the global system of financial domination, but this freedom exists, and we may say that qualitatively Viktor Orbán makes a much better use of it than Ferenc Gyurcsány did – supposing, of course, that the latter really wanted to make good use of it, which is a different issue.
Raoul Weiss: Yet they’re still sucking your forints out of the country.
László Bogár: Of course they are, it’s beyond doubt. And the money pump is here to stay, but as a Hungarian proverb says, “saving a little time can save your life.” The simple fact that a local identity, moreover such an identity which was quite unlucky historically during the last century – the Hungarian nation – was able, within a decade, to avoid being deprived of, say, a few miserable billions of euros per year may be sufficient to bring about change – enough to give it, for example, small incremental odds in the field of demography. Because, as you know, in Hungary as elsewhere, that is the most serious problem: in the last thirty years, the number of our deaths exceeds by one million that of our births. The population is aging, which unbalances the age pyramid, and the working population is plunging – which has the temporary advantage of upgrading the value of workforce, which makes wage rises possible: the famine of labour is such that capital is obliged to consent to small increases in wages.
But most importantly, it seems that Viktor Orbán embodies a victory of the realistic pragmatic option – in other words: that his strategy is likely to succeed.
Raoul Weiss: At present, Hungary is getting richer and is industrializing a bit; but it was not the same in the 1990s and early 2000s. This is a point I would like to come back to, since, in Western European political debates – often even in those of the Euro-critical circles – it has become customary to present the V4 countries as clever parasites, who have become masters in the art of sucking the blood of the great economies of the metropolis through European funds. Now, following your activity as a publicist, I was confronted with a radically different point of view on many subjects, and especially on what was the real nature of these transfers of wealth between East and West since the fall of communism – mostly during the period immediately following the regime change.
László Bogár: This view of the situation seems extraordinarily wrong to me. Indeed, in the years preceding 2004 (the year of Hungary’s accession to the EU) – that is to say, a period of [14 years, but] we could even say twenty years, since Hungary, as early as the 1980s, had passed some trade agreements with the EEC which were even more disadvantageous [than the current agreements] – Hungary unilaterally opened its markets. Let us not forget that, as early as 1988, Hungary was open to inflows of foreign capital. In this perspective, Hungary, as a country that opened its economic space without compensations, has in fact made an enormous contribution to the wealth of the West. There is at least a one-digit difference between the total of funds that left Hungary, whether in the form of profits or as interest on the debt – since its creditors were obviously Western European countries – and the total aid received by Hungary since accession.
Hence, one could say that, to some extent, the opposite is true: during the 14 years since the accession of Hungary to the EU, Hungary has only recovered part (…) of what Western European countries had unilaterally punctured during the 20 to 25 years elapsed before the 2004 accession. The reason why it is nevertheless difficult to address this subject in the media is that explaining this reality, making it understandable is incomparably more complicated than to resort to the striking but false metaphor of the wretched little cynical and filthy parasite of the East, which everyone understands without difficulty – which is even music to the ears of Western European citizens, because it at least has the merit of providing a scapegoat: thanks to such metaphors, they finally know what to think: “Here’s our problem! That’s why there is never money enough for us! Because we have to help out those punks!”
And the same goes for Greece – the lousy and lazy Greek society: everyone forgets to tell you that during the Greek crisis, [financial circles] have, without the slightest sound motive, pushed up to 35% the interests on Greek state paper in euros, by means of artificial hysteria, spreading the word that Greece was going bankrupt, and that this is precisely why it was necessary to maximize the interests, in order to protect the creditors in case of bankruptcy. Yet Greece did not go bankrupt, but, of course, none of those huge interest gains was ever payed back by any of those creditors who had used that bogey argument to plunder Greece. Everyone knew that Greece would not go bankrupt: everyone was playing – and keeps playing – a game of incredible cynicism.

“Our region is once again becoming a buffer zone whose geopolitical value is growing steadily” – 2/2

25-31 minutes

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Raoul Weiss: László Bogár, what is the economic reality of the V4? Until now, the main trade routes in Central Europe have been the East-West axes. What does Central Europe lack the most in order to assert itself also in the economic field? Are Central European economies not sufficiently complementary? Or is it the lack of North-South infrastructure – be it logistical or financial – to offset the dominance of East-West infrastructures? Finally: assuming that the V4 seeks to develop such infrastructure, to what extent do you think the West will tolerate such an evolution?
László Bogár: It’s all of that at once. There is an analyst of Russian origin on Bloomberg, a guy called Bershidsky, for whom I sometimes go out of my way: he’s a pure liberal, perfectly cynical, but he’s very sharp, he goes straight to the essential; he is the one who coined the phrase “foreign owned countries” to describe such countries. What he’s trying to say is obviously something along the line of:“Dear populists, what kind of game is this? We – the global capital –are your master”. Now, let’s face it: there is a lot of truth in what he says – especially in the case of Hungary. The most cautious were the Czechs. The least prudent, the Slovaks, since after all, Slovakia does not exist: it is a warehouse, partly German, partly French. The very moment these global giants collapse, countries like Slovakia, which are totally at their mercy, could disappear in a few minutes. In concrete terms, Slovakia exports all of its GDP. Of course, this is also the case of Singapore – but not under the same conditions…
In reality, all these countries are in the chains of the same plantation; in each of them, however, an awareness has arisen: they are beginning to understand the problem. Hungary is the country where the resistance is most marked, [for a good reason:] after Slovakia, we Hungarians are the most dependent in the group.
Raoul Weiss: From this point of view, the most independent country would be Poland.
László Bogár: It is indeed Poland. The first reason for that is that everyone was well aware that Poland should have emerged as a clear winner of the Second World War; however, of all the countries in this situation, it is the only one to have been totally treated as a losing country. This is partly true also of Czechoslovakia, but above all of Poland, whose suffering has been appalling, but never received the astronomical compensations to which it was entitled. But, as this implies a huge potential for revolt, we understand better that the Polish church and Poland’s rural society have been treated with more respect than elsewhere …
Raoul Weiss: Then how is it that, even though Poland has a head start in this area, the locomotive of this emancipation movement is rather Hungary…
László Bogár: It’s an intellectual difference, and it’s also about Viktor Orbán’s personality. It is linked to the fact that – even if the same could partly be said about the Poles and Czechs – the Hungarians, during the last three centuries, have been particularly forced to an optimal spiritual production. Not because they would in any case be more inclined than others to turn to things of the spirit, but because they were subjected to shocks, constraints and revolutions of such brutality, that their intellectual sensitivity must have come out of the process increased– I say this without underestimating that of the Czechs, or of the Poles, who have also been confronted with major existential challenges, bearing similar psychological consequences.
The ranking, though, is still the same: when it comes to intellectual fermentation, which can lead to the definition of a new global trend, a thought, an alternative global narrative, Hungary is always leading, because, if we take stock of – say – the last three hundred years, it is certainly the country of the region which had to face most spiritual challenges. Note, however, that this situation does not create tension with the Czechs and Poles, who accept this leadership with no hard feelings: the Poles one hundred percent, but the Czechs too, overall. In the three capitals – Slovakia is not a full-fledged player – the basic dilemma is the same. It is a collaboration between three high-culture nations (Czechs, Poles and Hungarians), which of course have also been opposed by conflicts, but which, on the whole, can look back to a thousand years of sympathy and cooperation. (…) Now, in these three nations, we are witnessing the same frontal intellectual clash between two sides. On the one hand, the local collaborators of globalism (…), which of course enjoy permanent international support. On the other hand, a camp that is more difficult to define. In Hungary, it defines itself as “the right”, the polgári[1] camp, national and Christian, popular and conservative – as you can see, it defines itself in a rather diverse way. This uncertainty reflects in part internal conflicts – from this point of view, FIDESZ is also in itself a great coalition, the crossroad of many currents, unified by the synthetic effect exerted on them by Viktor Orbán: while still fighting each other harshly, they do understand that they put more chances on their side by choosing the path of consensus.
How can such countries, threaded like pearls on the chain of global capital, living parallel existences and unable to relate to each other, possibly cooperate? To be able to do so, they first need a well-thought spiritual project. This is why I give extraordinary importance to the intellectual fermentation which is now happening. On the one hand, it is a mission that these countries will not fulfill within the next five minutes: it is, after all, nothing less than the opening of a new historical epoch, which should ideally be based on a lasting narrative, not a simple conjunctural arrangement or a passing optical effect that may vanish as soon as it appeared. This is all the more important as our region is once again becoming a buffer zone whose [geopolitical] value is growing steadily. Indeed, it is clear that the collapsing US empire, on the brink of death, is trying to weaken Europe, the EU, Russia and China – targeting each of these powers individually, but also by sabotaging as much as possible the networks that unite them. A perfectly logical strategy from America’s point of view – the trouble is that the biggest losers in this rampage are likely to be, once again, the countries in the buffer zone. Therefore, assuming this region does not want to pay the price again –let’s wish it does not! … Ukraine is the country offering the best image of the disaster that awaits us if we give in to the irresponsibility of myopic and selfish elites. From this point of view, Romania, too, is walking on thin ice … and might wake up with a painful hangover. Even the Baltic countries. Even the Poles, from time to time, are victims of an excess of visceral Russophobia, certainly understandable, but which may become dangerously counterproductive in the current situation.
All this, for the moment, is not very dangerous, but it is another sign pointing towards an imminent peak in the strategic valuation of the region, that the [competing] empires will therefore want to buy. It is therefore possible to make them compete and raise the stakes. Even without much thinking, I can mention four or five competing empires: the EU empire, Russia, China, America. [To which must be added non-territorial powers:] among the Jews, (…) the Soros-Netanyahu clash clearly shows that there is local Jewry and world Jewry. To speak of it, of course, is tantamount to a taboo – indeed, how to explain this shock, if not [assuming] that Netanyahu, speaking in the name of local Jewry, is signalling to Georges Soros that it would be time to show more responsibility when he plays with the fate of Jews around the world. (…) And lo and behold: Netanyahu comes here at the invitation of the V4 and invites them to Tel Aviv, or to Jerusalem – an event that, just a few years ago, would still have sounded like political science fiction. (…)
Raoul Weiss: Behind all these divorces, there is a major anthropological divergence, which was diagnosed a few years ago by the French geographer Guilluy in his bestselling book La France périphérique. In the meantime, he has made his reflection more international, in the form of his new book No Society, which contains numerous German, North American, and other examples – but the basic pattern remains the same: on the one hand, there is metropolitan humanity, the one living in Jerusalem, Tel-Aviv, Paris, Budapest …
László Bogár: In days of yore, this was called: the cosmopolitan world – although, it would be time to find a better word. (…)
But if the conflict between Netanyahu and Soros worsens … and some signs point in this direction – on some fundamental topics, in particular: Netanyahu [for example] does not hesitate to declare that the fate of the Jews in Europe – and here we speak of at least 2.5 to 3 million people – is tragically influenced by the migration problem, a debate in which he assumed positions diametrically opposed to those of Soros. From this point of view, such a situation should give us hope, if only because it is now possible to open such a discursive space. As for the direction in which it will evolve, this is a completely different question, but [for now all is still about] the mere existence of such a discursive space, where it becomes possible to address these questions with sincerity and humanity, to simply assert that there is a conflict area. It’a all about the simple fact that it is no longer possible to call an idiot anyone who dares to approach this subject, to get rid of it expeditiously by means of all sorts of innuendos and suspicions. Since it is now necessary to take note of the opening of this discursive space, which it is no longer possible to close. I would even say that any sane and morally healthy person should rejoice at the existence of this discursive space; later on we will see to what conclusions it will bring us.
Raoul Weiss: You are an economist, but an economist able to think beyond economy, to reflect about the fate of human communities. For the public opinion, if it were necessary to summarize in two words your reflections, the result would probably be: László Bogár, a thinker on the right. As far as I’m concerned, however, having read many of your editorials and followed a lot of the TV shows in which you participate, I have the impression that your perspective, in many ways, departs both from that of the mainstream European right, but often even from that of Hungary’s FIDESZ – or at least from the doctrine of the “first edition” FIDESZ in the 1990s and 2000s. When you write, for example, in the preface to your last book, that Hungarians in the 1950s were spiritually, morally and intellectually in much better shape than those of all subsequent generations. In view of such statements, it is obvious to me that we are moving away from “primary anti-communism” and that we are doing so to open up a critique of modernity that goes beyond the creed of polgári Hungary. In fact, you are a living example of this paradoxical truth that we, at the Visegrád Post, seek to popularize: from an ideological point of view, this “illiberal” Hungary is far more open than contemporary Western societies, which are dominated by an increasingly threatening unanimity-constraint.
László Bogár: All this is remarkably accurate. The reason is that – and there is no doubt that this was a lucky development in my life – for the last 16 years, I have not been subjected to the direct influence of political responsibilities. Therefore, all that I say and write is not the direct expression of this or that political current, but the consequence of my endeavour to force myself, and to force others, to contemplate with sensitivity the processes at work, both in the world, and in Hungary. Let’s have the courage to re-examine ourselves again and again. The courage of self-criticism. There is a media theory, called the theory of selective apperception, which predicts that, for reasons of energy saving, we have – all as much as we are – a tendency to pay attention only to such radio, television, press or other media contents which reinforces our beliefs; as for other contents, we do not even notice their existence. This is quite regrettable, insofar as it implies that, after a while, we end up having blinkers, or even feel that something is wrong (…); which makes you end up totally giving up. I know it’s very difficult, and often risky. [In spite of everything,] at the university, I always encourage my students to avoid thinking according to doctrines, despite the fact that higher education tends to indoctrinate them, which often terribly saddens me. I therefore strive, in my peaceful way, to wage an incessant struggle to keep up with what is – to put it now in the terms of a deeper philosophy – the only mission of man: to understand the totality of existence, and, once he finally gets to a harmonic understanding of existence, to fit into it, in a patient, peaceful and humble way.
Raoul Weiss: This makes me want to ask you: can this attitude of openness, this sincerity in the search for truth, become mainstream in the long term in the political sphere as it is currently configured, i.e. mainly according to the paradigm “right VS left” – or do you think that a paradigm shift [will be necessary]?
László Bogár: Such a change seems to me inevitable, in so far as it is also happening on a global scale. Look at Steve Bannon’s trajectory: how he seemed to come out of nothing, then seemed to go back to nothing (hopefully this is only an impression, because his ascent remains of great intellectual importance); in any case, he was seen getting dramatically close to, and then equally dramatically far from something that would have allowed him to exert an influence, not only intellectual, but also institutional. He is the man who assumes the intellectual paternity of the narrative that has removed Donald Trump from nothingness and despair to carry him to the presidential chair. And that’s why he was the first to fall out of favour. But this is yet another symptom that nowadays this is the side – the right wing, the polgári camp, the people’s side, the national, conservative, Christian camp, or all that at the same time, in harmonious or even conflictual combination –on which takes place the titanic intellectual work that must give birth to a new narrative, more or less unitary, more or less variegated, but capable – in its fundamental logic of existential interpretation – to provide the new global narrative. This is of course, for the moment, still a distant goal, and nothing guarantees even that it will be reached, but, from an intellectual point of view, there is constant endeavour in that direction – this cannot be overseen; to which we must add that we live in a world where the combat for the interpretation of fact, truth and reality has reached an intensity and visibility unseen in history. We might perhaps say that ever since ancient Greece, 2 500 years ago, we have not seen such an open and daily questioning of the foundations of fact, truth and reality.
The current situation is that intellectually, humanity is moving towards the most total chaos. (…) Once again, we have to acknowledge the duplicity of the tool – from the flint axe to Facebook: it can be the instrument of building and healing, or that of destruction and degeneration. As for which of these two scenarios will prevail, this is essentially linked to the evolution of the spiritual civil war, the ongoing global civil war: which of the competing narratives will be able to make the largest population chunk believe that they should take this or that direction, considering that all other narratives –as it is now becoming even visible – lead humanity to its loss, including from an ecological point of view. (…) The worst thing is that some of these deceptive narratives claim to provide a solution to the ecological problem. Let’s not forget that among the financial sponsors of Greenpeace, we find some of the worst polluters on the planet. Now we are witnessing the same processes in the spiritual sphere, since there is not one nature, but two: one is the external nature of man, the other, his inner, spiritual, moral, intellectual nature. And, in both natures, we are playing the spiritual equivalent of a global chess game, which would be at the same time a poker game in which every player is lying about his hand.
Raoul Weiss: Let’s turn a moment to the left. In Hungary – when seen from a French perspective, at least – one is struck to see that the pro-government press has the habit of blaming all the worst enemies of FIDESZ as”Marxists” –no matter, whether they target circles close to the Hungarian Socialist Party (which is indeed the heir of a single party that once was officially “Marxist-Leninist”), “ecologists” of the rather atypical LMP party, Macron-like ultraliberals of the Momentum party, or even the formerly far-right Jobbik party, ever since its recent “LGBT U-turn”. For me, I did read Marx, and I often have the impression that László Bogár has understood more out of Marx than, say, Gáspár Miklós Tamás[2], who, nevertheless, has obviously also read Marx. However, the true ideology of the latter (and this statement could be extended to all of the above-mentioned opposition movements) does not seem to be at all classical Marxism, but rather the kind of“radical illuminism” advocated and studied, for example, by Jonathan Israel. Nobody, though, would ever claim that László Bogár would be a Marxist; but perhaps the time has come to introduce also in Hungary the distinction – already common for a long time in French philosophy – between Marxists (those of Marx’s readers who also adopt his revolutionary program) and Marxians (those conceptually enriched by Marx’s thinking,who, however, do not become Marxists)?
László Bogár: A story is told about Marx – authentic or not, but a long-living one in any case: Marx, who was a choleric man, amidst a fit, declares that he is certainly not a Marxist. Until the end of his life, he strove to remain mentally flexible: to assimilate contradictions and, if necessary, to modify his own views. It must be recognized that Marx was a true thinker. From this point of view, even if we do not accept any of his views, we should still recognize in him an intellectual phenomenon worthy of attention. As for me, what seems to me the most objectionable to Marx – whose analyzes, though, always gave me food for thought –are the writings of his youth, those of his journalistic period, that show a Marx who has nothing against Capitalism, who is in no way opposed to modernity, modernization – quite the opposite! … Those writings leave no doubt that, for him, capitalism has a fundamentally positive function. When it utterly ruins, first spiritually, then of course materially too, what he then sees as his real enemy –traditional sacredness –, he welcomes it without any hesitation, and he does so in Germany during the end of the first third of the nineteenth century! This is what opposes me directly to his thinking.
But let us return to “dialectical materialism” (the name under which Marxism was taught in Hungarian universities during the communist era): to me, the dialectical interpretation of history suggests exactly the opposite narrative. For me, it is the “Enlightenment” that I see as a process of systematic spiritual darkening. And – even if this argument may seem demagogic – let me point out that 95% of the tourists who visit Europe – whether internal or external tourism –, when visiting cities, are looking for the products of that dark age that preceded the Enlightenment, the age of the cathedrals, rather than those of the following ages – which, in my opinion, speaks volumes. Even if we had no other objection to the doxa, it would still be worth thinking about: how to reconcile this fact with the general idea that there was first a dark and horrible and inhuman “middle age”, followed by a wonderful age, after which everyone is happy, because humanity has reached the time of perpetual peace, well-being and happiness – at the end of which, in accordance with Fukuyama’s predictions, the triumph of global liberal capitalism solves all our problems in one movement.
If there is a dialectic of history, as I get older, I am more and more prone to agree with Spengler, who, in the Decline of the West, misses no opportunity to emphasize that history, as such, does not and cannot have purpose or meaning. What exists are cultures, enormous flashes, gigantic cultural exploits, during which man, within the framework of a certain configuration of being, by application of certain self-repeating patterns, or fractal structures, gives birth to fantastic, breath taking creations: the age of the cathedrals. Then, like everything that lives, it reaches a peak, becomes lazy, hardens, becomes heavier.
This is, however, the main reason for his distinction between culture and civilization: the West began as a sacral culture, during – say – six centuries, those of the Roman and Gothic styles in architecture, then, for some reason, the mechanism derailed. At that moment, it is so full of itself that it becomes parasitic. No longer yielding new cultural performances, it begins parasitizing itself, then discovers more and more the means of parasitizing others: it is the age of the “great discoveries” and colonization. Then, in the end, it stagnates: nowadays, obviously, Westerners even lack the will to reproduce. They still live a short hedonistic phase, making a living out of all kinds of scams, but they’re more and more unhappy, more and more bad-tempered, more and more degenerate. Unfortunately,this phase was the last century.
Spengler did not pose as a prophet. He too only made suggestions. And he was not a scholar. His book is rather philosophical poetry – which, as we can see, reaches deeper layers. By staying at the level of instincts, intuitions and suggestions, in fact, he gets a more accurate portrait of this entity known as the West. If, therefore, there is a dialectic of history, if history has the slightest sense and purpose –an idea in which I tend to believe less and less – then the answer can only be the one given by Spengler: when a great culture is in the process of ascension, all – from the individual to the greater or lesser groups of individuals –spiritually strive to bring to the surface all they are capable of. Then, for a while, they try to maintain what they have produced. And then, after a while – to paraphrase a line by Attila József – “everything that exists falls apart”.
On the entropy scale, there is no [backtracking]. Everything in this world that comes into existence ends up, of course, deteriorating. As long as [a culture] retains its spiritual strength, the force that allows it to maintain order – by which one must naturally understand: the order of the sacredness – and to elevate it to an ever higher organizational level, it keeps evolving forwards and remains truly precious, ascending; then, from the very day this stops functioning … It is also the case of our [individual] lives: obviously, they reach a climax, which is the moment when we are theoretically capable of all the successes – both physical and spiritual – of which man is capable in this world. In practice, this is a point that most often we do not reach, but there is in any case a culmination, after which we let go, and this is not surprising. We always imagine that everyone dies, but that we will live forever. Empires, too, those types of organization of being, and large cultures, show this tendency to imagine themselves as immortals. Now, if I dare say: nothing is eternal, except change. But the essence of change is to operate in cycles: conception, birth, ascension, decline, collapse, destruction – then, in the happiest case: return to humus, where a new life can germinate. I like to believe that in Latin, humus (the earth), homo (man, humanity) and humilis (humble) are derived from the same root. I hope that this coincidence of man, earth and humility in some archaic stratum of language is not the work of chance.

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László Bogár (on the Left) and Raoul Weiss (on the Right) in Budapest, November 2018. Photo: Visegrád Post

[1]Translator’s note: we decided to give up on this Hungarian word, which is largely untranslatable to most Western-European languages; several equivalents (such as “civic” or “bourgeois”) can be found in dictionaries, but, in such context, all of them would be highly misleading. Polgári is an adjective derived from the substantive polgár, which was borrowed from the medieval German Bürger (which also gave bourgeois in French and, hence, English); this word can sometimes be translated as “citizen” (an English word sharing the etymology of German Bürger), sometimes by “bourgeois”. In Western-European languages, however, in a political context, the civic notion tends to refer to legal citizenship, i.e. to a republican(i.e. modern, anti-monarchical and secular) view of the nation – which is not the case of Hungarian polgár– whereas the political use of the term “bourgeois”evokes economistic and liberal Weltanschauungs – which, again, is not the case of the Hungarian word (for diverse reasons – the most important probably being the difference in industrial development between the two sides of the continent, which explains why Hungary has, until these very last years, never grown a modern –i.e.: urban and industrial –bourgeoisie).
[2]CEU professor and a major figure of anti-FIDESZ demonstrations.